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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MOROCCO.

PART 62.

JULY–DEC. 1927.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MOROCCO

PART 62

JULY TO DECEMBER 1927

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Further Correspondence respecting Morocco.

PART 62.

CHAPTER I.—FRENCH ZONE.

(a.) Accession of Sultan Moulay Mohammed.

[W 10886/10711/28] No. 1.

Acting Consul-General Rapp to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 185.)

Sir, *Rabat, November 19, 1927.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that Sidi Mohammed, until now usually known under the diminutive form, Hammada, third son of the late Sultan Moulay Youssef, was yesterday proclaimed Sultan by the ulema at Fez, and will reign under the name of Moulay Mohammed-ben-Youssef. The news was conveyed to me yesterday evening at 6·30 P.M. in a telephone message from M. Merillon, "chef du cabinet diplomatique." I have not yet, however, received written notification.

2. On the afternoon of the death of Sultan Moulay Youssef, the ulemas began their sittings for the election of the new Sultan, and it was yesterday afternoon at about 4·30 P.M. that definite choice was made. The proclamation then took place with military honours, and a messenger sent to warn M. Steeg, who was awaiting the decision. It is stated that M. Steeg will be received in solemn audience this morning by the new Sultan, who will, in the course of a day or two, make his entry into Rabat.

3. Moulay Mohammed is 18 years of age, and reputed the most promising of the young princes. He appears to have received a careful education, and to speak French fluently. The local French press speaks warmly of his good feelings towards France.

I have, &c.
T. C. RAPP.

[W 11254/10711/28] No. 2.

Acting Consul-General Rapp to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 189.)

Sir, *Rabat, November 26, 1927.*

WITH reference to previous despatches on the death of His Majesty the Sultan Moulay Youssef and the accession of his son, Sidi Mohammed, terminating with my despatch No. 186 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report on these events written by His Majesty's vice-consul at Marrakesh.

2. The doubts cast by Mr. Were on the accuracy of the statements which attribute the age of 18 to the new Sultan are apparently shared by the bulk of the

population outside official circles, and I have often heard 14 suggested as nearer the mark. On the other hand, M. Merillon, "chef du cabinet diplomatique," has told me unequivocally that Sidi Mohammed is 18. From personal observation, I believe that he has the beginning of a moustache, although his cheeks are soft, white and hairless. It is true that when last year he was married at Marrakesh some criticism of the marriage was heard based on his too tender years, but I have been told that he has since become the father of a child by his then bride. The most reliable unofficial estimate I have heard, and which physical indications support, is 17.

3. With regard to the capabilities of the present Sultan, there is the same conflict between the official view and popular opinion. The former is eulogistic, the latter equally derogatory. A journalist who accompanied them to France last year informs me that Moulay Idriss, the eldest son, is wild, a lover of wine and women, but the most intelligent of the family and full of initiative. The second is dull and unenterprising. The third, Sidi Mohammed, has so far shown no particular brightness or indication of independence, but is the most suitable figurehead of the three.

4. There is more than a suspicion that the Resident-General is seeking by his handling of the present situation to recoup some of the political capital recently lost through the escapade of his nephew at Beni Mellal. In this connection there seems almost inspiration in a passage in the "Petit Casablancais," a paper very favourably disposed to M. Steeg, and which reads: "Cette proclamation (du nouveau Sultan) est un gros succès politique remporté par le Résident général et fait honneur à ses hautes qualités d'homme d'Etat. M. Steeg rend, en ce jour, un inestimable service à son pays, qui connaîtra seulement plus tard toute l'étendue du geste habile et sage qui permettra à l'œuvre française au Maroc de s'appuyer plus fortement que jamais sur le Maghzen."

5. Unfortunately, however, for M. Steeg a slight hitch occurred in the publicity arrangements for the solemn audience, reported in my last despatch, as General Mougin, the head of the Cabinet militaire, denied access to all journalists, thus causing offence and the omission of any account of the proceedings in the French or Moroccan papers of the morrow. On hearing of this, M. Steeg ordered an expression of regret to be made to the press representatives, and the text of the address to the throne and the reply of the Sultan were published a day later. But the effect was lost, and the staff work of the Residency put in an unfavourable light. I enclose a copy of the text of these two speeches taken from the local press.*

I have, &c.
T. C. RAPP.

P.S.—A despatch (No. 108 of the 25th November) just received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Fez on the same subject is also transmitted.

T. C. R.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Vice-Consul Were to Consul Selous (Casablanca).

(No. 80.)

Sir, *Marrakesh, November* 22, 1927.

THE news of the death of Moulay Youssef was received here by the native population with the apathy which is characteristic of them, the more so as the late Sultan, unlike his brothers and immediate predecessors, Moulay Abd-el-Aziz, and in particular Moulay Hafid, was but little known in Marrakesh. But the selection as his successor of Moulay Hamada (or, as he now becomes, Sidi Mohamed) has occasioned some surprise and, in many quarters, disappointment.

2. Custom decrees that the choice of his successor shall be made by the reigning Sultan before his death, and that the nomination shall thereafter be confirmed by the ulema of Fez. In the present instance it is not clear (and it is perhaps significant that no official pronouncement on the point has been made) whether Moulay Youssef had expressed any desire in the matter, and still less so whether he designated Moulay Hamada, in preference to one of his other sons. I hear, indeed, from one source (the Basha of Marrakesh) that the late Sultan wished his eldest son Moulay Idriss, to succeed him. Moulay Idriss, who is about 21 years of age, has for some years represented his father in Marrakesh, with the title of Khalifa. Just over twelve months

* Not printed.

ago he was married to his first cousin, daughter of the Cadi of Marrakesh and of the Sultan's sister, to whom Moulay Youssef was reputed to be much attached, and the existence of this matrimonial tie between first cousins, much prized in Morocco, as in other Moslem countries, might have been expected to have considerable weight. On the other hand, it is pointed out that it is the general rule for Moorish parents to favour their younger children at the expense of their adult progeny, who separate from them as soon as they reach the age of puberty, and are thereafter out of sight and out of mind. But, in any case, no regret is expressed at the supersession of Moulay Idriss, who is an exceptionally stupid and inert young man, and has the reputation of being a wine-bibber and an evil liver.

3. It is, of course, generally suspected that Moulay Hamada has been raised to the Sultanate by the French authorities, in defiance of, or at least without regard to, the wishes of the late Sultan, for their own ends, and especially with a view to the more complete and rapid enslavement of the Moorish people; for, rightly or wrongly, Moulay Youssef is credited with having on occasion steadfastly opposed the introduction of measures which he conceived to be unjust or to bear too hardly on the native population, and with having, in general, kept his end up with the protecting Power in a manner which his young and inexperienced successor cannot be expected to adopt. Whatever the facts of the matter may be, there are one or two circumstances which seem to point to a desire on the part of the French authorities to gloss over the conditions in which the choice was made and to present it in a rather more favourable light than is strictly justifiable. The first of these circumstances, to which I have already referred, is the absence of any official announcement, such as might have been expected, of the wishes expressed by the late Sultan, or of the omission by him to indicate any preference in the matter. The second circumstance is the presentation of Moulay Hamada as being 18 years of age, whereas I am assured by one who professes to know him well that he is not more than 12 or 13; and, incidentally, the "Vigie marocaine" of yesterday contains a photograph of him, which has every appearance of having been faked by the addition on the negative of a slight but distinct moustache.

4. It may be asked to whom the suffrages of the population of this region would be given, supposing that the matter were left to their choice, seeing that they have no love for any of Moulay Youssef's sons. It would certainly not be the basha of the town, whose name I have seen suggested in this connection in a more than usually ill-informed French newspaper; but in the same article the correct reply was adumbrated in a hint as to the possible recall of Moulay Abd-el-Aziz or Moulay Hafid. Of the two, Moulay Abd-el-Aziz would be first choice, principally because of his entire dissociation from the history of Morocco since the establishment of the Protectorate, a merit which does not attach to Moulay Hafid, who is, however, well known and well liked in Marrakesh, and who has the minor distinction of having parted from the French on bad terms. That neither of the two brothers would have accepted the Sultanate, had it been offered to them, is realised only by a very few.

5. In the meantime it is satisfactory to note that Sidi Mohamed has made his State entry into Rabat in the midst of the most exhilarating downpour of rain that has refreshed this fortunate Empire for some years—a circumstance of which M. Steeg no doubt availed himself, in the course of his first official call upon the new Sultan, to work off his well-tried epigram: "Gouverner, c'est pleuvoir."

I have, &c.
C. A. W. WERE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

Vice-Consul Mackereth to Acting Consul-General Rapp (Rabat).

(No. 108.)

Sir, *Fez, November* 25, 1927.

THE following observations on the death of the Sultan Moulay Youssef and the accession of Sidi Mahomet, which I now have the honour to submit to you, may serve to provide local colour to the official accounts and so form an addendum to Mr. Simmonds's despatch No. 105 of the 21st November, 1927.

2. The death of Moulay Youssef, although prognosticated several months ago, occurred in the end with dramatic suddenness. At about 6 A.M. on the 17th November the Sultan felt suddenly unwell and sent for Dr. Many, who cupped him; within half an hour of this the patient died of a seizure said to be heart cramp.

Dr. Many then went to the Mellah, a mile distant, to breakfast. From the palace rumours of the Sultan's death spread rapidly through the native population, and in a couple of hours reached the ears of the general commanding the Fez district, who hastened to the palace to obtain confirmation. In the palace precincts, however, his way was barred by the slaves, who would not allow him to approach the body. He there learnt that Dr. Many had been present at the decease and that he was then probably in the Jews' quarter taking coffee. The general, accompanied by his A.D.C. and the "chef des services municipaux," set off to scour the Mellah cafés for the important witness of the death. They found him unmoved and sipping his "café au lait"; he confirmed the news that the Sultan was dead. A second opinion was suggested. Dr. Many raised no objection, but maintained "Cela n'est point nécessaire, il est bien mort." Another doctor was found, but as the slaves would let no one approach, Dr. Many's uncorroborated evidence had to suffice M. Steeg was then informed of Moulay Youssef's death. Morocco is still "le Pays du Paradox." Where else could a Sultan, who, but two years before, had been fêted by all France, and only a year before extorted tens of thousands of pounds under French protection from a groaning population to celebrate the marriages of his sons, dies so ingloriously. *Sic transit gloria mundi.* The Sultan, whose whim to prejudice a British subject's case before the courts of justice, could not be challenged by the Resident-General!

3. The Sultan had no time in his expiring seconds to nominate a successor, although he had frequently suggested his eldest son as his heir. The Grand Vizir proposed to the ulema of Fez the name of the third son, and, so says malicious rumour, the ulema knew better than to oppose the powerful Vizir, who enjoyed the backing of the French, and, to most people's surprise, Sidi Mahomet was proclaimed. There seems little doubt that Mahomet is a better specimen than his elder brothers, yet his nomination was surrounded by much intrigue, which is amusing to the outsider. So far as it interests the man in the street, that is practically not at all, Sidi Mahomet is as good as another. The interested parties are all to be found in the families of the Vizirs. To them it means ruin or riches.

4. To understand the by-play it is necessary to go back to the late Sultan's reign, when the hajeeb, or chamberlain, Ababou, had obtained an influence with Moulay Youssef that was quite unusual; his power eclipsed even that of Hadj Mahomet-el-Mokri, the Grand Vizir. The significant feature of this state of affairs was that the perquisites that normally come to the Grand Vizir found their way into the pockets of the hajeeb. Now, it frequently happens that the new Sultan changes the chamberlain and seizes the properties of the previous holder of the office; even the Vizirs were often imprisoned. Ababou, convinced of the ultimate succession of either the first or second son, fawned upon them, but took no pains to cultivate the affection of number three. Indeed, he went so far as to persuade the Sultan to put Sidi Mahomet in prison on the charge of persistently quarrelling with him (the hajeeb), and then to banish him and his mother to Fez, where he conveniently was when the late Sultan died. Had Ababou been here instead of in Marrakesh an interesting position might have arisen, for there is little doubt that he would have maintained the Sultan's nomination of Idriss or Hassan, and thus tried to safeguard his own position. Still, it is pretty certain that the French were never anxious to have the eldest, who is said to dislike them, or the second, who is half-witted; they would thus have had something to say. As it was, the Grand Vizir was first on the spot and submitted the name of the third son to the ulema, doubtless with the French blessing, for El Mokri is a true, if, in the past, he has been an expensive, friend of France. The first act of the new Sultan, guided by his Grand Vizir, was to supplant his father's chamberlain by Ben Aish, a son of Abd-el-Aziz's hajeeb. Ababou is now quaking and bribing his enemy, Mokri, in order to preserve as much of his ill-gotten gains as may be. Nevertheless, it will be surprising if a charge is not found by his enemy that will justify his being put into prison.

5. What part the French have taken in the drama is very obscure; my own impression is that they have been carried rather on the stream of events than that they had any hand in directing it. After all, it really makes little or no difference to them who is Sultan. Any opposition to their rule will surely arise, not within, but without the palace walls. As for the native population, it has no respect for any Sultan kept in his position, as they believe, by a foreign army. The apathy of the people at the various ceremonies connected with the change of Sultans was most marked, and no effort was made by the French to invest the proceedings with even the pomp provided at the reception of a junior general of their army. How different

it was from the displays that followed the death of Hassan and the succession of Abd-el-Aziz.

6. It had been thought by many that El Maamry, the Algerian tutor of the late Sultan's sons, would take the place of Ben Gabrit as Master of the Protocol; Ben Gabrit was certainly very anxious as to his fate, and at a dinner I attended last Sunday he was making great efforts to obtain the support of General de Chambrun and M. Marc. I gathered, though, that the French are wishful to maintain both persons in the Sultan's entourage, for their presence tends to increase the French influence in the Royal household. Therefore, it is likely that El Maamry will be retained in the palace as Mentor in Particular to His Majesty, at least for a time.

7. I have heard surprise expressed that a young son should have been selected to succeed Moulay Youssef, but Moroccan history is full of precedents. The most recent was that of Moulay Abd-el-Aziz, who was about the eighteenth son of Moulay-el-Hassan, who had eighty-seven sons. But, as far as I can discover, in previous cases where a younger son was selected it was done during the lifetime of the father, who took pains to educate his chosen successor in his duties. In this case such education was bestowed on the first and second sons.

8. I cannot escape the feeling that the French failed to take a worthy part in the ceremonies. If they wished to show that they were backing the new Sultan they failed miserably in staging an impressive show. If, on the other hand, they wanted to demonstrate their desire not to interfere with local custom they again failed, for they have left a definite belief that they have been pulling the strings all along. "The French," the people say, "wanted Sidi Mahomet, and so he is Sultan—a Sultan more French than his father." Altogether, the result seems to suggest that M. Steeg was preoccupied over the question of the ransom of his kidnapped kinsmen, and had formed no provisional plan of action in the event of the late Sultan's death, which he must have known to be imminent. A Kitchener or a Lyautey would not have let such an occasion pass.

I have, &c.
GILBERT MACKERETH.

(b.) Miscellaneous.

[**W 6831/600/28**] No. 3.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 128.)
Sir, *Rabat, July* 11, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of a despatch, No. 42 of the 27th June, addressed by His Majesty's vice-consul at Marrakesh to His Majesty's consul at Casablanca relative to the military and political situation in the south-west of Morocco. Mr. Were's despatch is all the more interesting as little or no information has been made public for some time past as to the position in the areas governed by the Grand Caids under shadowy French control. The question whether that system should be altered is, as you know, always in the background of French policy in Morocco, and criticism of its maintenance is sometimes heard even in French quarters. Should the Protectorate decide to tackle the problem, the Glaoui influence would be one of the chief factors to reckon with, a fact of which the Glaouis themselves are well aware. Mr. Were emphasises the rôle played by Si Hammou, a technically subordinate member of the family, as compared with that of its head, the Pasha of Marrakesh, whose constant enrichment is a notorious scandal, but who has played a cautious game with the French and made interest in many French *milieux*.

2. As an illustration of how these problems are popularly regarded in this country, I may mention a mere rumour which came to my ears some months ago. It was about the time of the Imperial marriages at Marrakesh, and the periodical report was in circulation that the Grand Vizir, El Mokri, was too ill to carry on. The story was that the Sultan, in the course of the marriage festivities, had sounded Hadj T'hami about appointing him Grand Vizir with the deliberate object of drawing him into the innermost circle of the Makhzen and thereby removing his sting. The story went on that the Glaoui bowed to the dust as in duty bound and lost no time

in pulling every string he could in French political circles to prevent the honour from being offered more definitely.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier and a copy to His Majesty's consul at Casablanca.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Vice-Consul Were to Consul Selous.

(No. 42.)

Sir, *Marrakesh, June* 27, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to report that a collision has occurred within the last few days, in the neighbourhood of Imintanout, between partisans of the Caid M'tougui and dissident elements dwelling in the Djebel Seksaoua and Djebel Douirane. The conflict apparently followed or arose from a premature attempt at pacific penetration. The casualties suffered by the rebels were appreciably heavier than those of the loyal partisans, and, as a result, certain dissident fractions have made their submission to the French authorities.

2. In the Todra district, north of Djebel Sarro, there has for some time been apparent a certain amount of unrest, for which Si Hammou-el-Glaoui, nephew of Hadj T'hami, Basha of Marrakesh, is suspected of being responsible, his object being the manufacture of an excuse for the offer of his services, the acceptance of which would entail the equipment of his supporters with arms and ammunition. So far the French authorities have returned evasive answers to his requests. Si Hammou has for long been a thorn in the side of the French, whose respect for him exceeds even that accorded to Hadj T'hami. Si Hammou, living almost continually at Telouet, the principal seat of the Glaoua chieftains, has, in fact, to a large extent usurped the influence formerly and properly belonging to Hadj T'hami, the feudal chief of the clan, whose prestige has been much diminished by his passive neglect and active spoliation of his tribe. It would, I think, be wrong to deduce from Si Hammou's scheming to secure arms any intention of adopting a definitely hostile attitude towards the protecting Power, his object being rather to acquire an additional pawn in the game that is in perpetual progress between them, and thus to stave off the evil day when regular government will inevitably be established in the Glaoua country.

3. Two versions of the dismissal from his post of the Basha of Taroudant are current here—one, to the effect that he was discovered to be in correspondence with the rebel tribes of the Anti-Atlas, and that he is to be replaced by a nonentity, a former "Mokhazni" from Rabat; the other, that his extravagance and profligacy provoked an outcry amongst the native population, and even from his own sons, one of whom is to be appointed in his stead. If the latter version be the true one, it is permissible to express surprise that the authorities should have allowed, if not encouraged, the Basha to entertain all and sundry (including, with all due respect, M. Steeg) on a lavish scale during the ten days of the Marrakesh Fair, in April last.

I have, &c.
C. A. W. WERE.

[W 7342/2466/28] No. 4.

Consul-General Sir A. Ryan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 137.)

Sir, *Rabat, July* 22, 1927.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 221 of the 30th November last, I have the honour to state that the usual summary of the budget of the French protectorate for the year ending the 31st December, 1927, was published in the "Bulletin officiel" of the 28th June, much earlier, that is to say, than last year. I have now procured a copy of the complete budget, and I submit my usual report on the estimates.

2. The following table gives the figures for 1926 and 1927 in the same form as in my despatch under reference :—

Estimates of Expenditure.			Estimates of Receipts.		
——	1926.	1927.	——	1926.	1927.
Ordinary Budget.	Frs.	Frs.	*Ordinary Budget.*	Frs.	Frs.
Debt Charges	101,603,169	131,072,893	Agricultural Tax ("Tertib")	93,225,000	137,390,000
Expenditure other than Debt Charges	305,312,603	400,579,346	Customs	107,100,000	131,350,000
			Consumption duties on sugar and alcohol ...	68,005,000	83,005,000
			Posts and Telegraphs ...	21,132,300	28,000,000
			Other receipts credited to ordinary budget ...	117,959,720	152,084,110
Total of ordinary budget	406,915,772	531,652,239	Total of ordinary budget	407,422,020	531,829,110
Special Budgets.			*Special Budgets.*		
Expenditure chargeable to proceeds of loans ...	70,517,088	55,803,288	Proceeds of loans and connected operations ...	70,517,088	55,803,288
Expenditure chargeable to reserve fund and other specially affected resources	58,934,000	85,399,600	Specially affected resources ("taxe spéciale")	29,375,000	32,500,000
			Specially affected resources (reserve fund)...	14,349,000	44,509,600
			Specially affected resources (miscellaneous)	15,210,000	8,390,000
Grand total of expenditure	536,366,860	672,855,127	Grand total of receipts...	536,873,108	673,031 998

3. There is again a large increase in the total of items under the head of Public Debt. This increase, amounting to nearly 30 million francs, is mainly due to the practice of including under debt charges certain dead-weight expenditure on pensions, &c. The largest single item in the increase is 12 million francs, resulting from an arrangement made in 1924 in favour of officials with past military service. Other increases are accounted for by a new charge of 2 million francs by way of contribution for a propaganda scheme to boom North African phosphates; the transfer to debt charges of the cost of the French gendarmerie ("Tabor No. 1") at Tangier, amounting to 2,340,000 fr.; the similar transfer of that portion of the Moroccan subvention to the French war budget which was last year charged to reserve fund, namely, 3,130,000 fr.; and a small increase of 104,810 fr. in the cost of pensions to ex-Sultans, &c. If these items be deducted, the increase in debt charges proper reduces itself to 9,894,914 fr., made up as follows :—

	Francs.
Increase in respect of 1904 and 1910 loans, mainly due to cost of service of latter in pesetas	4,092,087
Increase in respect of 1914–18 loan, resulting on balance from an increase from 12 to 18 per cent. of the tax on "service du coupon"	502,827
Net increase in respect of "frais d'émission et service des obligations émises par le Protectorat pour la construction des chemins de fer marocains," after deducting a contribution (less in 1927 than in 1926) from the Phosphates Office	8,300,000
	12,894,914
Deduct estimated decrease in the amount which will be required to finance short-term borrowing ...	3,000,000
Net increase in debt charges proper	9,894,914

4. This analysis shows the debt situation in a more favourable light than the total figures appear to do at first sight. Apart from the inevitable increase in the

cost of the 1910 loan as a result of the depreciation of the franc, the only substantial increase arises out of the liability of the protectorate under its arrangements with the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Maroc. I do not understand the details of those arrangements, but they have recently undergone a change. The company was authorised by a dahir of the 6th November, 1926, to contract in Holland and Switzerland a loan of 20 million florins=41,600,000 Swiss francs. This loan, like others, is guaranteed by the Moorish and French Governments, but in introducing the 1927 budget in the Conseil du Gouvernement on the 22nd November last (see my despatch No. 222 of the 30th November), M. Steeg claimed that it would enable the company to come to the assistance of the Government. I will deal later with another financial combination intended to enable the company to start work on the normal-gauge railway from Fez to Oudjda.

5. Turning to expenditure other than debt charges in the ordinary budget, it will be seen that the increase in 1927 as compared with 1926 is much greater than in 1926 as compared with 1925. This increase is spread over nearly all the principal heads of expenditure, and is mainly due to the financial crisis of last year with its repercussion on salaries and the cost of all commodities and services. The budget has been made to balance by corresponding increases in the estimates of the yield of the principal sources of revenue. These increases are partly automatic in the sense that the same causes which have caused expenditure to rise have had a similar effect on revenue, as in the case of the customs duties and all *ad valorem* taxes. It is claimed that the same causes will improve the yield of the agricultural tax, and that its proceeds will also be augmented by improved methods of collection.

6. No new taxes have been created since the institution as from the beginning of 1926 of consumption duties on petrol, tyres, matches and playing cards, which were estimated to produce 5,500,000 fr. in that year, and are put at 7,200,000 fr. in 1927. There have, however, been minor changes. Thus, for instance, tax on matches was placed upon a new basis in the course of 1926; the increment tax on real property was abolished and replaced by an increase from 5 to 7 per cent. of the registration tax on transfers; and taxes like the " patente " and " taxe urbaine " are being gradually extended to new centres.

7. The two special budgets, as usual, balance automatically. That connected with the proceeds of loans presents no new feature. The total amount of 55,803,288 fr. is earmarked for various purposes, the largest single item being 20,500,000 fr. for ports. I am not enough of an expert in finance to understand the position of the loan money as a whole from the published statements. It would appear, however, from a statement made by the Director-General of Finance in the Conseil du Gouvernement on the 26th April, that he contemplates a new issue of 400 million francs, and hopes by this means and by a modification of the programme drawn up in 1920 to provide a fund of about 600 million francs to be spent over a period of five years. One of the principal objects of this combination is to enable the construction of the normal-gauge railway from Fez to Oudjda to be undertaken under a new agreement with the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Maroc, less burdensome to the finances of the protectorate than the agreement already in existence regarding that railway.

8. The second special budget of expenditure chargeable to the " taxe spéciale " and other specially affected resources shows an increase of close on 30 million francs, regard being had to the transfer to debt charges of the portion of the subvention to the French military budget, which last year was charged to reserve. The " taxe spéciale " is estimated to produce more than in 1926. No details are given of the expenditure chargeable to it. The reserve fund is prosperous, as the ordinary budget has shown substantial surpluses for some years. The fund stood on the 31st December, 1926, at over 106 million francs, of which 80 millions were liquid assets. The 40 millions odd of expenditure to be borne by it in 1927 is divided under a number of different heads, mostly in the nature of public works and development, the largest single item being 13 millions odd for roads and bridges.

9. An important new development has been the creation by a dahir of the 4th January, 1927, of an autonomous " Caisse de l'hydraulique agricole et de la colonisation." One of the main objects of this measure is to provide for the financing of the important irrigation works promised in M. Steeg's speech of the 22nd November, to which I have already referred. The separate budget of the caisse for 1927 provides for expenditure of 33,390,600 fr. against receipts of 33,394,230 fr. The dahir sanctioning this budget does not give details, but from the report of the Offices des Phosphates for 1926 it appears that the office was to

contribute 26,800,000 fr. to the caisse during 1927. This illustrates the extent to which the phosphate monopoly has become a factor in the financial system of the protectorate. It is, indeed, only one of several ways in which the administration derives benefit from the monopoly. The report of the office for 1926 shows that during that year it paid over 7 million francs in ordinary taxation, nearly 12 millions by way of participation in the service of loans for electrical and railway purposes, 4 millions towards the jetty at Casablanca, which has now become the phosphate quay, and about 2½ millions in respect of the cost of first establishment of the industry, which was borne at the outset by the protectorate.

10. I will not burden this report with further details. I have gone into the general financial position at some length, because the years 1926–27 may be regarded as marking the beginning of the second phase in the evolution of the French protectorate. The previous fourteen years were a period of pacification and organisation under Marshal Lyautey. The second phase is that of consolidation and intensified economic development. The division is, of course, an arbitrary one, as the process has been continuous and there has been no change in main lines of policy, but the end of the Riff War and the advent of a civilian Resident-General nevertheless constitute a new starting-point. My general conclusion from the above review is that, despite the formidable increase in the budget estimates as a whole and the enterprising character of the new programme, M. Steeg's claim to be following a prudent financial policy is probably well founded. I say " probably " because of my inability to grasp the full import of the debt situation and the projects for further borrowing, and because the capacity of a country with a population of less than 5 million souls to stand the strain of so much intensive development is still an uncertain factor.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the acting British consul-general at Tangier.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

[W 7802/600/28] No. 5.

Sir A. Ryan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 152.)

Sir, *Rabat, August 10, 1927.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 128 of the 11th July, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a very interesting despatch, No. 56 of the 26th July, addressed by His Majesty's consul at Marrakesh to the acting British consul at Casablanca regarding the dismissal of the Pasha of Taroudant and its repercussion in native circles in Southern Morocco. Mr. Were's despatch strikingly illustrates the unsatisfactoriness of a system under which the French buy the support of quasi-feudal chieftains by giving them a more or less free hand in their own areas and tolerating their abuses, while once in a way taking a strong line as they did when they got rid of the Grand Caid Goundafi some three years ago and have now done in the case of the Pasha of Taroudant, a person of great authority, though of less degree than the grand caids. As he points out, the methods employed are more reminiscent of the old régime in Morocco than worthy of a Protectorate, and the effect on the survivors is to stimulate their apprehensions without improving their conduct. The head of the Glaoui family, Hadj Thami, is one of the more painful products of the contact of two civilisations, a rapacious tyrant at home and a sort of imitation Frenchman, in externals at least, in Paris. Mr. Were describes amusingly the rivalry between him and El Ayadi, who is also powerful, and who, I believe, takes an interest in what goes on in the Moslem world, though he is not so well-known in foreign circles as the Glaoui.

I have, &c.
ANDREW RYAN.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Vice-Consul Were to Acting Consul Broome.

(No. 56.)

Sir, *Marrakesh, July* 26, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch No. 42 of the 27th June, that the removal from his post of the Basha of Taroudant has aroused in native circles considerably more comment, universally bitter, than might reasonably have been expected. A circumstantial story, emanating from the Sultan's brother-in-law, Cadi of Marrakesh, reaches me to the effect that Moulay Youssef has refused to acquiesce in the dismissal of the Basha, having too recent and happy memories of the magnificent reception accorded to him in Taroudant on the occasion of his visit towards the end of last year. Moulay Youssef has, I believe, displayed on at least one other occasion, in his dealings with the Protectorate authorities, an obstinate side to his character, which the poor state of his health may possibly have exacerbated. Hadj Thami, the Basha of Marrakesh, as also El Ayadi, his fellow grand caid, is distinctly perturbed by the action of the authorities, which he looks upon as foreshadowing possible similar measures in regard to himself, and has even considered the advisability of resigning his office and retiring to the comparative safety of Tangier. I do not think that there is any immediate likelihood of his proceeding to such lengths, however, with so many of his multiple interests still ill-secured and so many questions of title to property as yet outstanding.

2. Of the two versions of the grounds for the dismissal of the Basha of Taroudant mentioned in my earlier despatch, the second, attributing it to his extravagance, is, it is now clear, the correct one. The attitude of the authorities appears to have been dictated by panic inspired by criticism of their failure to relieve the misery existing in the Souss and the necessity of finding a scapegoat rather than by a sudden realisation that the Basha was living beyond his legitimate means. I am informed that the members of the ex-Basha's entourage in Taroudant have been cast into gaol almost to a man, together with their families and slaves, while he and his family are sequestrated in his house at Marrakesh, and such of his familiars as happened to be in Marrakesh at the time of his sudden change of fortune have orders from the head of the Department of Native Affairs not to leave the town without his permission. This indiscriminate incarceration of guilty and innocent alike is exactly on a footing with that of Sultans of pre-Protectorate times in the case of officials who had the misfortune to incur their displeasure, and Moors of all classes are once again asking themselves—and others—in what respect the creation of the Protectorate has changed the order of things in Morocco for the better. I am not prepared to say that there is no satisfactory answer to their query, but certainly the improvements that have been introduced are not as apparent to Moorish as to European eyes, at all events in Marrakesh and the south-western portion of the Empire generally. To take an instance, Marrakesh has recently been equipped at great cost with a town water supply on modern lines, a boon to the population of the arid European suburb of Gueliz, but of little interest to the conservative inhabitants of the native town; to obtain the requisite supplies of water it has been deemed necessary to turn a blind eye to existing water rights in the Reraya Valley, and at least one large native-owned estate, containing some 30,000 olive trees, is threatened with extinction in consequence. Again, Marrakesh now possesses a network of tarred, macadamised roads which evokes the enthusiastic praise of every tourist; but the native who has his life and being in the city, and who contributes, in the shape of "droits de porte" on agricultural produce brought into the town, and of other more recently created taxes, the greater part of the cost of that luxury, certainly fails to appreciate very deeply the change from the uneven tracks of former times, on which his mule or ass was more at home. But perhaps the most astounding instance of the official enslavement to the "politique de façade" is provided by the proposal to demolish and re-erect on a slightly different alignment, at a cost of 7 million francs of the taxpayers' money, a block of modern shops and flats, the plans for which were duly passed by the competent authority, because it interferes to some extent with the view of the "Koutoubia" from the J'ma-el-F'na. I am glad to say, however, that this scheme has aroused universal execration, and is not likely to be proceeded with.

3. I have already referred to the fact that El Ayadi, Caid-in-chief of Rehamna, shares the misgivings of Hadj Thami in regard to future developments in this district. There is, however, little probability of their making common cause in face

of a threat to their supremacy in their respective fiefs, for, though outwardly polite to one another, they are violently antagonistic beneath the surface, and their periodical squabbles provide the necessary comic relief in a situation which must cause the authorities much anxiety. El Ayadi has long coveted the Bashaship of Marrakesh, an office in which his experience as a highway robber would stand him in good stead, and never fails to press his claims thereto, backed by appropriate gifts, whenever the Sultan honours the southern capital with his presence. Hadj Thami has, however, been able to hold his own at that particular game. Ayadi is, however, quite resourceful, and amongst other stratagems employed by him as a means to his end is the purchase of a French newspaper, complete with editorial staff (not an expensive matter in this country), in the columns of which he lays bare, without too fine a regard for the law of libel, the less reputable incidents in Hadj Thami's career; but Hadj Thami has countered with a similar investment, and in his turn exposes Ayadi's past record to a glare of publicity which it can ill support, the two offensives thus cancelling out. Ayadi, it is commonly supposed, invented the story of the offer to his rival of the post of Grand Vizier (mentioned in Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 128 of the 11th July), hoping thus to sow the seeds of an idea which might result in the attainment of his ambition, but whether the offer were ever really made or not, Ayadi's hopes are unfulfilled and are likely to remain so. Of late they have become involved on opposite sides in a typically Moorish imbroglio, too complicated for relation here, and have manifested their antagonism by placing each a guard on the house of the other, rather after the fashion of two children "daring" one another.

4. Hadj Thami continues to expend large sums on every side. Among his latest ventures are the purchase of a considerable estate at Tangier at a cost of some 2 million francs, and the outlay of 7 million francs odd on the erection of a block of flats at Casablanca. Reckoned in sterling, these amounts may not appear to be particularly formidable, but drawn as they are from a district where a million francs represent the combined annual income of 300 native wage-earners, they are sufficiently large to be disquieting. He has just left Marrakesh on his annual jaunt to France, where he will no doubt succeed in dissipating his usual 2 million to 3 million francs.

I have, &c.
C. A. W. WERE.

[W 10065/600/28] No. 6.

Mr. Gurney to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 203. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, October* 18, 1927.

I HAD a long conversation recently with the Basha of Marrakesh, Hadj T'hami-el-Mezwari, more commonly known as the Glawi, who is spending a few days here on his return to South Morocco from a two months' visit to France. He recently bought the Perdicaris estate, close to the town of Tangier, and he now stays there when he passes through the zone on his trips to Europe. I had met him for the first time at dinner at Hadj Mehdi-el-Menebhi's on the previous evening, when Mr. Harris, of the "Times" newspaper, was also present, and the Basha had then expressed a wish to see me alone. I accordingly drank tea with him at Menebhi's, the latter discreetly withdrawing. I was accompanied by Mr. Hope Gill, who acted as interpreter.

2. After a long and not uninteresting discussion on Europe and Morocco and their differing customs and religions, I made as if to leave, when the Glawi at last brought himself to the point of asking me to listen to "two words" which he wished to say to me. I, of course, assented. He began by relating and stressing the excellent relations which he had always enjoyed with my predecessors, notably with Sir Reginald Lister, "on whom be the Mercy," and with whom he had often hunted. He trusted that similar relations would continue with myself, whom he was glad at length to meet. To these remarks I interjected suitable replies. He passed on to mention that he had made other notable acquaintances, among them Count Volpi, at that time Governor of Tripoli, as a result of whose visit to Morocco he had been honoured with a high Italian decoration. He also possessed a Belgian order.

3. He was, of course, he went on to say, on excellent terms with the French and was working in close co-operation with them. He, nevertheless, had his enemies. To my objection that they were small and unimportant ones, even if they did exist, he replied that it was just the small men who remained in Morocco and ultimately rose to prominence. He foresaw a day of trouble, and would wish to have some link which would enable him to look to the British authorities for some small measure of support when that day came, and he hinted that such a link might be afforded by the bestowal of a British decoration.

4. I replied at once that any interference by the British in the internal affairs of Morocco was out of the question. His Majesty's Government had already given their word to the French that they would not intervene in Moroccan domestic politics, and I was therefore unable to give him any second word which might encourage him to look to the British authorities for support. I felt sure that a man of honour like himself would fully appreciate the position. Not only, however, was it impossible in principle to extend to him any such hope, but in practice also it was clearly inadvisable in his own interest to show him any such signal mark of favour as a decoration bestowed by His Majesty the King would imply. So anxious was I, indeed, not to arouse any suspicion against him in the minds of the French, and possibly prejudice his usefulness to his own countrymen, that I had even refrained from asking him to dine at my house, as I would have much liked to do.

5. The Glawi, however, was curiously insistent in his plea. He again emphasised his cordial relations with the present Protectorate régime, although I could see that he sadly missed Marshal Lyautey, and said that although, of course, the day of trouble was still far distant, he could not avoid observing its approach. He was doubtless in a strong position, with friends and relatives everywhere, but he might eventually be attacked through them. At a later date, he asked himself, what should he do, what would the French do, when he wished to retire from the arduous duties of his position? He quite realised that the old days, in which Menebhi received protection and honour, were past. He did not ask for protection, but just something which would serve as an excuse for our putting in a word in due season on his behalf.

6. I replied, as I felt bound to do, that with the best will in the world I could hold out no hope of any sort of intervention on the part of His Majesty's Government. His obvious and proper course was to continue to co-operate closely with the French authorities for the good of himself and of his country. I personally wished him every success in his work and would follow his course with the greatest interest and sympathy, but it could only be from a distance. The interview closed on this note. It was very cordial throughout, and the Basha spoke with great simplicity and apparent sincerity.

7. He did not appear to expect any other issue, although he strove for better success and made his points with some insistence. His future position is undoubtedly a precarious one, and he naturally wishes to bolster it with whatever means he can. I have not, however, learned of any other *démarche* which he may have made in the international sphere.

8. Our conversation throws an instructive light, I think, on Sir Andrew Ryan's despatch to you, No. 152 of the 10th August last, in which he enclosed an interesting report by His Majesty's vice-consul at Marrakesh on the fate and fears of the Lords of the Atlas.

9. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to the acting British consul-general at Rabat.

I have, &c.
HUGH GURNEY.

[**W 11311/11311/28**] No. 7.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 6.)

(No. 2397.)

Sir, *Paris, December* 5, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that during the discussion of the budget of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, M. Berthon, one of the Communist Deputies, insinuated that, at the time when M. Malvy was negotiating on behalf of the French Government with the Spanish Government in the summer of 1925, some secret agreement had been come to

between the two Powers. According to M. Berthon, this agreement provided that Spain should abandon to France her protectorate in Morocco in return for a monetary compensation, while at the same time Italy would receive a mandate over Syria and Great Britain be given a free hand in Libya.

2. M. Briand declared that M. Berthon's statements were entirely without foundation, and that no secret arrangements had been come to with Spain either in 1925 or later. M. Briand's remarks were confirmed by M. Malvy, who declared that the agreement concluded with Spain in 1925 covered three points and three points only: namely, (*a*) the collaboration of the two countries in suppressing contraband; (*b*) the drawing up of the joint terms of a peace offer to Abd-el-Krim; and (*c*) the elaboration of the measures which were to be taken by the two countries in combination in the event of the Riffians rejecting the terms of peace.

3. These statements did not satisfy M. Berthon, who again enquired whether France had not come to an arrangement of some sort with Spain in regard to the future of Morocco and, in particular, in regard to a possible evacuation by Spain of the Spanish protectorate. M. Briand once more assured the Chamber that no such agreement existed and that the only arrangement which had been come to with the Spanish Government had been made in order to deal with a situation which had long since been liquidated and had ceased to exist.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

CHAPTER II.—SPANISH ZONE.

[W 10261/14/28] No. 8.

Mr. Gurney to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 3.)

(No. 212.)

HIS Majesty's consul-general at Tangier presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of despatch No. 222 from His Majesty's consul at Tetuan, dated the 25th October, respecting the views in civilian and military circles on the general position in the Spanish zone.

Tangier, October 28, 1927.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Consul Allchin to Mr. Gurney.

(No. 222. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tetuan, October* 25, 1927.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 135 of the 19th October, I have the honour to report that the views attributed to General Primo de Rivera in the bogus account published in the "Sunday Express" of his interview with His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs tally closely with opinions which are generally held and have recently been expressed in civilian and military circles here. Most of these opinions traverse well-known ground, but it is perhaps interesting that the discussion of withdrawal from the zone should have revived.

2. It is considered here that the pacification of the zone which Spain has now achieved at heavy cost, in the general European interest rather than in her own, should be rewarded in part by the cession to her of rights of as wide a nature as possible over Tangier. These rights, it is hoped, would be of benefit to the zone from both the civil and military point of view. In the event of a renewal of tribal dissidence, the native would be deprived of the refuge and moral support which Tangier has hitherto afforded him, and, in the meantime, disarmament and supervision in the Tangier zone by Spanish officers would reduce the risk of a fresh outbreak being fomented there. At the same time, it is thought that, if Spain could obtain such rights over Tangier as to be able to regard it as part of her own zone rather than as an unfriendly alien, she would be spared the trouble and possible humiliation of trying to compete with Tangier by creating residential districts, ports and railways in the western Spanish zone.

3. Local opinion has it that, for various reasons, some of which are connected with the origin of the Spanish zone and Great Britain's notorious unwillingness to admit French predominance in this part of Morocco, His Majesty's Government should declare themselves in support of the present Spanish claims. Hitherto, His Majesty's Government's abandonment of Spain to go into conference alone with powerful and inflexible France has given the impression that British sympathy is not with her. Spain must therefore use what levers she can to gain British support. Withdrawal from the League of Nations so far seems to have been a fruitless move, but, in view of the importance attached to the League by His Majesty's Government, may yet prove to be of some effect. The threat to abandon the Spanish zone, introducing the possibility of the assumption of the whole protectorate by France, may also serve.

4. The time-worn threat of withdrawal seems on the face of it to be emptier than usual at a moment when tribal difficulties are non-existent and when important sums are being devoted to the development of the zone. There are, however, certain contrary considerations. In the first place, it is now generally believed that Spain can hope for no material profit from Morocco. The leisurely prospection in the Rif, which was for the first time made possible by last year's advances, has so far failed to confirm any of the extravagant rumours of mineral wealth there. Secondly,

Spain might now state that, with the pacification of the zone, her mission was complete, and might hope that withdrawal, which earlier would have been construed as an ignominious confession of failure, would now assume the honourable quality of an altruism that had sown without caring to reap. It would also save the heavy disappointment and cost that a possible recrudescence of dissidence would occasion.

5. In spite of the apparent reasonableness of these considerations and of the fact that I know them to appeal to certain important officials here, I am of the opinion that withdrawal from the zone is not at present within the field of practical politics, and that local vested interests, military and other, are in themselves strong enough to preclude its being carried into effect. In any case, of course, it is not local opinion, but that of General Primo de Rivera which counts.

I have, &c.
G. C. ALLCHIN.

[W 10764/14/28] No. 9.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 598.)

Sir, *Madrid, November* 17, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to report that I paid a private visit of three days to the Spanish zone of Morocco last week, and that I was received with exceptional courtesy and attention by the Spanish authorities, both civil and military.

2. It had been evident to me for some time past that the Spaniards felt rather bitterly that few people outside their own country appreciated the great difficulties with which they had had to contend in their zone during the fighting which lasted for such a number of years, and which has happily ended in the complete pacification of the zone. They also feel keenly the fact that tourists in Morocco almost invariably go to the French zone and neglect the Spanish zone. This, of course, is not surprising in view of the fact that it has only recently been possible to travel in the Spanish zone, the mountainous nature of which is very different from the wide plains which are met with in the French zone.

3. The Spaniards did not conceal the pleasure which they felt at my visit to their zone, and I think that this visit has, as far as we are concerned, removed the impression that we did not appreciate their recent difficulties in Morocco.

4. I was given an opportunity of visiting Sheshuan, a city about 50 miles inland from Tetuan, which had remained strictly closed to the outside world until the Spanish forces under General Berenguer occupied it in the autumn of 1920. Up to that date only three Europeans had, I am told, succeeded in penetrating into the city, amongst these three being Mr. Harris, correspondent of the "Times," who, on that occasion, was disguised as a Moor. As you are aware, the Spaniards were obliged to evacuate the town in 1924, and to conduct a very difficult retreat to Tetuan. They reoccupied it in the spring of this year, but very few persons other than military have yet visited it.

5. The military road to Sheshuan—running as it does between high mountains—enables the visitor to realise the great difficulty which the Spanish High Command must have experienced in extricating their forces from the city, and, in fact, the whole character of the country enables him to understand, as nothing but a personal visit can, the reasons for which that command found it so difficult to deal with the tribes concerned in the recent rising.

6. The above is the first impression I formed. Secondly, I was much impressed by the type of officer whom the Spaniards are now employing in Morocco. He is keen, alert and intelligent, and some of the younger officers reminded me of the type of British officer who, for instance, administers large tracts in the Sudan.

7. The Spaniards seem to be proceeding on sound lines in their relations with the Moors, whose religious and other customs are scrupulously observed. No Christian troops are quartered in Sheshuan, and no Christian is allowed to set foot in that town after 6 P.M. The Spaniards evidently intend to rule, as far as possible, through natives, and the Acting High Commissioner, Señor Saavedra, informed me that—now that the zone had been pacified—his task as a civilian was beginning in earnest, and it would be for the civil administration to develop the country.

8. None of the Spaniards with whom I came in contact would affirm positively that the Spanish Government would have no further trouble with the tribes, but nobody believed in a general rising. Three conditions would be necessary for such a rising, namely, combination between the tribes, the acquisition by the latter of arms and munitions, and a leader. I gathered that the tribes are practically disarmed, it being estimated that only some 2,000 rifles remain in their possession. Not a shot has been fired in the Spanish zone since the 11th July last.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

CHAPTER III.—TANGIER ZONE.

(a.) Franco-Spanish Negotiations.

[W 6187/11/28] No. 10.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 4.)

(No. 331. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, June* 29, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to report that I called on General Primo de Rivera yesterday before proceeding on leave of absence.

2. His Excellency said that the Spanish Ambassador in London was already in receipt of a copy of the latest note which the Spanish Government had addressed the French Government in connection with the conversations about Tangier. The Spanish Ambassador has already, no doubt, communicated this note to your Department. General Primo de Rivera said that in this note the Spanish Government, after refuting various observations made by the French Government, categorically renewed their request for the organisation by Spain of the police in the International Zone. I understood his Excellency to say that this force, as contemplated by the Spanish Government, would consist of a Spanish commandant with three Spanish officers and 300 Moors. The demand in question did not infringe the sovereignty of the Sultan, nor did it run counter to international treaties.

3. General Primo de Rivera said that he knew that the French Government attached great importance to obtaining the control over the whole of the Beni Zerual tribe. The Spanish Government were quite ready to concede this demand, but they really must have something in return. He pointed out that the soldiers of both nations had always got on well together and that there had never been any difficulties between them. Thus the former Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco—General Bérenguer—had been on excellent terms with Marshal Lyautey, and he himself had had the best relations with Marshal Petain. But then M. Steeg—of whom he spoke disparagingly—had come, and matters were different. This led General Primo de Rivera to indulge in a characteristic dig at politicians of all countries.

4. His Excellency went on to observe that all the subordinate French "officiers d'intervention" were hostile to the Spaniards. It was a curious fact that French rifles of the latest pattern and French bank-notes had been found on the bodies of two Moorish rebel chiefs who had recently been killed. I asked whether this statement meant that the French had purposely been stirring up trouble for the Spaniards in the latter's zone, and suggested that it was a common practice in oriental countries, when faced by two powerful adversaries, to endeavour to sow dissension between those adversaries. It was incredible that the French should have been inciting the Moors against the Spaniards.

5. I said that I sincerely hoped that the two delegations would come to some arrangement in Paris. His Excellency said that he would now await the reply of the French Government. The King of Spain, on passing through Paris recently, had spoken about Tangier, both to M. Doumergue and to M. Poincaré, but both, of course, had been non-committal. The conversations had now been proceeding for five months without any result, and, if the French refused his latest demand, he would withdraw his delegation from Paris and publish to the world his reasons for this step. I said that it would be deplorable if the conversations broke down. The effect on both countries would be bad, and a statement such as he foreshadowed would only envenom matters. General Primo de Rivera quite admitted this, and went on to say that, if the Tangier conversations broke down owing to the unyielding attitude of the French, the latter must not be surprised if they failed to obtain consideration for the requests that they would certainly make in connection with the forthcoming commercial negotiations. France would, for instance, demand reduced duties on champagne and silk, but the Spaniards would have no inducement to grant these demands.

6. His Excellency finally said that he did not think that the conversations about Tangier would result in any agreement unless you were to intervene. As long as the French felt that His Majesty's Government was behind them they would concede nothing. I at once took up this point, and said that, as he ought to know

perfectly well, you had purposely abstained from expressing any opinion on the proposals or suggestions made either by the French or the Spaniards during the Tangier conversations. You had stood aside and had been absolutely impartial. He admitted this, but it was clear that he nevertheless wished to convey that the French were allowing the Spaniards to suppose that their stiff attitude was due to a belief that they had the sympathy of His Majesty's Government in their opposition to the Spanish demands.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD.

P.S.—The "Sol" publishes to-day what appears to be an official communiqué to the effect that the Council of Ministers which met yesterday did not discuss the delicate question of the Tangier conversations. The reason being, says the "Sol," that even if Spain's aspirations are being brought down to a level out of keeping with her ambitions, the Spanish Government are so determined to maintain a close friendship with the French Government in Morocco that they will go as far as may be necessary (without, of course, neglecting essential points which Spain considers vital), rather than endanger a collaboration which is from every point of view beneficial for both Spanish and French interests in the Moroccan zone.

H. R.

[**W 6372/11/28**] No. 11.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir H. Rumbold (Madrid).

(No. 322.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 7, 1927.*

THE Spanish Ambassador reverted to-day to the negotiations between Spain and France in regard to Tangier. After recalling the message which Sir William Tyrrell had transmitted to him from me while I was in Geneva and the reply which his Government had returned to it, he handed me a copy of the Spanish memorandum in answer to the last French proposals. This memorandum, he observed, was of such importance that, whilst anxious not to take up too much of my time, he thought it necessary at once to read me a summary of it which he had prepared in English. From this summary it appeared that the Spanish Government were quite unable to accept the last proposals made by the French and, after reciting all the efforts which they had made at conciliation and the successive reductions in their demands, concluded with the statement that their absolute minimum was the control of the Tangier gendarmerie and police.

After reading the summary and again dwelling on the great efforts which Spain had made to reach a solution and upon her friendly disposition towards France, the Ambassador added that this was the irreducible minimum below which Spain could not go and that, if this were refused, the Spanish Government would be forced however reluctantly to withdraw from the Tangier administration and even perhaps to place their interests in Tangier in charge of a neutral.

I said that the statement which the Ambassador had made to me was obviously a very serious one. When I had met M. Briand at Geneva in the second week of June, he had spoken to me despondently of the course of the negotiations in Paris. He had said that the French Government were in a few days about to place further suggestions before the Spanish negotiators, and it was in these circumstances and of course without knowing what the new proposals were to be that I had asked Sir William Tyrrell to express my concern and my earnest hope that the Spanish Government might find in these new proposals an acceptable solution. I was very sorry that this had not been the case and the possibility that the conversations might end without agreement naturally interested me. I asked myself what I could do to prevent such a misfortune. The only step that occurred to me on the spur of the moment was that, acting upon the information first given to me by M. Briand and now confirmed in an even graver form by the Ambassador, I should propose to both Governments that, before breaking off their discussions, they should invite Great Britain and Italy to join them. It had of course been contemplated that we should be called in to consider the agreement which we had hoped the two Governments most immediately concerned would have reached between themselves and, having regard to the obligations which all of us had incurred towards Italy, it would obviously be

impossible for Great Britain now to join in those conversations unless Italy were also invited to participate. I should not, however, care to make this suggestion merely to have it rejected by either the Spanish or the French Government. Could the Ambassador tell me whether, if I decided to put forward such a suggestion officially, it would be acceptable to his Government?

Marquis Merry del Val said that he was unable to answer my question as his instructions were exhausted by the communication which he had already made to me.

I told him that I should be obliged if in the most informal way he would make the enquiry. I was, as he observed, speaking without time for reflection and merely on the first impressions left upon me by what he had read and said to me, but I thought that I would speak to the French Ambassador in the same sense. It was at any rate the only suggestion that occurred to me at the moment, and I trusted that the Spanish Government would not in any case break off the Paris conversations until there had been time for its consideration.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

[**W 6372/11/28**] No. 12.

*Memorandum respecting the Tangier Negotiations presented by the Spanish Delegation in Paris to the French Delegation.—(Communicated by Spanish Ambassador, July 7.)**

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a examiné l'exposé concernant la négociation de Tanger remis le 13 juin par la délégation française à la délégation espagnole. Il a apporté à cet examen minutieux les mêmes sentiments de cordialité, d'impartialité et de désintéressement dont il s'est inspiré, envers la nation amie et voisine, depuis le commencement de ces pourparlers.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a éprouvé une très pénible impression en voyant à quel point les justes demandes espagnoles ont été peu appréciées jusqu'à présent par le Gouvernement de la République.

Il trahirait l'esprit de loyale sincérité qui lui est caractéristique s'il tâchait de dissimuler ses sentiments. Il a témoigné depuis le premier moment de son intention incontestable d'arriver à ses formules susceptibles d'amener la solution conciliatrice de cette question épineuse, d'autant plus impossible à ajourner—et plus que jamais dans des moments où l'action militaire touche heureusement à sa fin—qu'elle est directement liée à la tranquillité de l'Empire marocain. L'Espagne a porté son effort militaire aux limites extrêmes, aux moments les plus critiques pour la sécurité de l'Empire; elle a dû transporter au cœur de la dissidence une armée nombreuse, pourvu des éléments de combat les plus modernes et les plus coûteux: elle a réussi, enfin, après des combats aussi victorieux que durs—pendant lesquels ses pertes se sont élevées à plus de 5,000 hommes—à mettre en franche déroute le chef du soulèvement, lequel, fugitif et vaincu, a dû faire appel à la générosité française.

Cet ensemble de circonstances semblait devoir mériter du Gouvernement de la République, et après une si longue méditation de sa part, quelques concessions dont l'efficacité positive eût mis le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, sinon dans les conditions qu'il estimait indispensables, au moins dans des conditions qui lui permettraient de ne plus considérer à l'avenir la question de Tanger comme un cauchemar pour la sécurité de sa zone de protectorat. L'Espagne pouvait s'attendre à une solution honorable et pratique.

Il n'en a rien été, malheureusement, et il suffit pour le prouver de comparer sans passion les demandes espagnoles aux concessions que le Gouvernement de la République semble prêt à accorder.

Il est douloureux de le constater, mais il n'en résulte pas moins *qu'aucune des aspirations espagnoles, sans excepter les plus modestes et minimes*, n'a mérité, de la part du Gouvernement français, un accueil favorable, malgré leur compatibilité, non pas seulement avec les traités en vigueur et avec l'esprit du statut de 1923, mais aussi avec les limites que le Gouvernement français lui-même semblait avoir acceptées, puisque, dans toutes les notes et les échanges d'impressions antérieurs au commencement des pourparlers, le Gouvernement de la République se disait prêt à examiner,

* See No. 11.

avec la plus grande attention et bienveillance et avec le désir de donner satisfaction à l'Espagne, les demandes concernant la contrebande et la sécurité de la zone espagnole, ainsi que les allégations d'un caractère politique qui pourraient se rapporter au problème de Tanger et au point de vue du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

La première aspiration espagnole, exposée dans le mémorandum présenté par la délégation dans la séance du 15 février, consistait dans la dénonciation—moyennant l'accord amical des trois Puissances signataires—de la Convention de Paris de 1923 et dans l'incorporation dans la zone espagnole de la ville de Tanger et de l'hinterland qui l'entoure.

Certaines modalités concernant l'organisation administrative auraient assuré le contrôle des Puissances, le caractère spécial de la zone tangéroise (considéré comme essentiel par les traités en vigueur) et le respect de la souveraineté du Sultan, intangible pour le Gouvernement espagnol.

Il serait fatigant et superflu de renouveler la solide argumentation sur laquelle le Gouvernement espagnol a fondé ses revendications. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté se vit refuser toute discussion de sa formule ; il reçut, pourtant, l'offre, qui ne laisse pas de le surprendre, de quelques concessions territoriales dans la zone de Tanger—concessions, d'ailleurs, minimes, qui n'avaient fait l'objet, de la part de l'Espagne, d'aucune sollicitation et sur lesquelles la délégation espagnole se permettra de revenir plus tard.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, malgré sa conviction que la formule proposée par lui était la seule pratique, se fit un devoir d'accepter en principe et conditionnellement les concessions territoriales en question ; il cessa d'insister sur sa première prétention —pourtant si raisonnable et légitime—et se borna à solliciter ce qui suit (séance du 28 avril dernier) :

Que l'Administrateur soit espagnol ;

Qu'un degré d'influence analogue à celui dont la France jouit à l'Assemblée législative soit accordé *de fait* à l'Espagne. (Cette égalité d'influence entre les deux pays n'est aujourd'hui qu'apparente) ;

Que le contrôle de la douane soit confié à des agents espagnols ;

Que le Mendoub soit nommé par le Sultan, sur la proposition du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté et avec l'assistance d'un fonctionnaire espagnol.

Enfin, et dernièrement, quoique le *caractère essentiel et primordial de cette demande ait été, depuis le premier moment, signalé par le Gouvernement espagnol :*

Que la police de la ville, ainsi que celle de la banlieue, soient mises sous la dépendance exclusive de fonctionnaires et d'officiers espagnols, directement placés eux-mêmes sous la juridiction du Mendoub par l'entremise d'un haut fonctionnaire, également de nationalité espagnole.

Aucune de ces demandes, pas une seule d'entre elles, n'a mérité, de la part du Gouvernement de la République un accueil favorable. A ces revendications, dont l'intérêt vital pour l'Espagne a été déjà souligné, le Gouvernement de la République oppose un refus catégorique dont on ne peut que louer la forme polie et affectueuse, mais dont l'argumentation n'en est pas moins spécieuse.

Le Gouvernement espagnol a reçu, en revanche, les offres suivantes :

1. Une cession territoriale, déjà proposée antérieurement, d'après laquelle un certain secteur de la banlieue tangéroise ferait partie à l'avenir de la zone espagnole. De cette offre est exclue, en tout cas, la fraction des Andjeras qui fait partie encore à l'heure actuelle de la zone internationale. En compensation, il est exigé de l'Espagne :

   (*a.*) Qu'une sorte d'amnistie soit accordée aux habitants des douars appelés à passer sous la juridiction du protectorat espagnol ;

   (*b.*) Que les Européens ainsi que les indigènes propriétaires de terres situées dans la contrée en question, aient la possibilité d'obtenir du Maghzen le rachat de leurs propriétés à des prix susceptibles d'être fixés, en cas de désaccord, par voie d'arbitrage ;

   (*c.*) Que les autorités espagnoles assurent à leurs nouveaux ressortissants le maintien de leurs rapports économiques traditionnels avec la ville de Tanger et avec sa banlieue ;

   (*d.*) Que le 2½ pour cent afférent aux marchandises à destination de la zone espagnole soit cédé en faveur du port de Tanger et de ses travaux publics ;

   (*e.*) Qu'il soit procédé à une revision des limites entre les deux zones du Maroc et que la tribu des Beni-Zéroual passe intégralement sous la dépendance du protectorat français ; enfin,

   (*f.*) Que le droit de poursuite soit accordé, à titre de réciprocité, dans les régions d'Ifni et de Rio de Oro.

2. Une modification de l'article 10 du statut et du Code pénal tendant à donner plus d'efficacité aux dispositions qui interdisent toute altération de l'ordre établi dans les deux zones de l'Empire.

Qu'est-ce qui est offert, en définitive, au Gouvernement espagnol ? Une fraction de la zone de Tanger, dépourvue de tout intérêt par rapport aux préoccupations du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté et aux fins légitimes qu'il poursuit. Une cession comportant un modeste élargissement de la zone de protectorat espagnol qui n'éprouve pas le besoin d'être agrandie ; une modification, enfin, dont il n'est pas permis d'espérer le moindre résultat et qui ne saurait éviter que dans Tanger et dans sa banlieue—légèrement réduite du fait de cette cession—on puisse continuer à intriguer contre l'ordre établi dans la zone espagnole. Elle viendrait, au contraire, augmenter les difficultés et les entraves du fait de la situation des nouveaux douars—soumis à une sorte de double dépendance—et du fait en même temps des conditions onéreuses dont il a été déjà question concernant le rachat éventuel des terres.

Une considérable compensation territoriale serait encore due par l'Espagne : la confédération des Beni-Zéroual serait totalement abandonnée en faveur de la zone française. La faculté de poursuite qui n'intéresse nullement l'Espagne serait finalement octroyée non seulement à Rio de Oro, mais dans des territoires comme celui d'Ifni appartenant à l'Espagne en pleine souveraineté et dont le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a décidé l'occupation dans un bref délai.

Non. Une semblable cession territoriale, isolée et soumie, en outre, à des conditions aussi nuisibles aux intérêts espagnols, ne saurait être acceptée.

Elle ne comporterait la solution d'aucun des problèmes qui préoccupent à juste raison le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté. Elle signifierait au contraire, pour la zone espagnole, une charge nouvelle et une nouvelle complication. Elle serait interprétée par l'opinion mondiale, si l'Espagne venait à l'accepter sans obtenir rien d'autre, comme le signe d'une politique impérialiste qui est bien loin des desseins du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté. Les intentions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, au contraire, tendraient plutôt à la cession au Protectorat français d'une partie de sa propre zone, sous la condition, bien entendu, d'obtenir à Tanger ces concessions minimes, et d'un ordre plutôt moral que matériel, que le Gouvernement espagnol estime indispensables, pour arriver à ne pas avoir éternellement les yeux et la pensée tournés, comme actuellement, vers les événements de Tanger et vers les complications éventuelles venant de Tanger, et susceptibles d'avoir dans la zone espagnole une répercussion fâcheuse. Toute l'attention des autorités espagnoles pourrait alors se consacrer, dans une sage politique de protectorat, à l'œuvre de pacification, commencée déjà, après un admirable et pénible effort militaire, dont les résultats heureux sont indiscutables.

Or, s'il est évident que seule la zone de Tanger pourrait, en tout cas, bénéficier de cette concession apparente (quoique les rapports de la ville avec la zone espagnole deviendraient plus compliqués) ; s'il est évident qu'elle est, en définitive et considérée isolément, plus qu'inacceptable, préjudiciable aux intérêts espagnols, que restera-t-il des offres formulées par le Gouvernement de la République ?

Quelques légères modifications de l'article 10 du statut et du Code pénal sans la moindre transcendance pratique. Les torts et les dangers signalés par le Gouvernement espagnol ne sont pas imputables, en effet, aux dispositions en vigueur, mais plutôt à certains organes chargés de leur application, qui, tentés souvent—dans un sentiment de patriotisme aussi mal compris qu'exalté—d'agir sans bonne foi ni franchise, rendent inefficaces les lois et les conventions. Telle est la façon d'agir, vraiment suicide, de certaines autorités de la zone française en ce qui concerne l'application des accords si bien orientés de 1925 et de 1926. Ces dispositions sont, malheureusement, dénaturées dans la pratique. Elles sont, pourtant, l'expression de la volonté et des accords des deux Gouvernements et ont abouti à des résultats aussi admirables que ceux que nous touchons, pour ainsi dire, précisément dans ces jours-ci, mémorables pour l'histoire de la totale pacification des deux zones.

Un examen froid et isolé des laborieuses négociations présentes porterait le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, en face d'un dénouement si dépourvu de tout intérêt et si minime, à les déclarer terminées dès à présent ; à se considérer totalement mésestimé et à regretter même d'avoir envoyé des délégués pour n'aboutir qu'à des modifications

insignifiantes qui auraient pu être négociées sans autre formalité qu'un simple échange de notes.

Mais le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a de la mission confiée à la France et à l'Espagne au Maroc une idée très élevée et complètement au-dessus des égoïsmes et des égarements d'opinion, que personne, d'ailleurs, n'a jamais imputés à la nation espagnole, mais que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, fort de son autorité, trouverait en tout cas le moyen d'empêcher.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a apporté à la collaboration avec la France, stipulée aux accords de 1925 et 1926, toute sa bonne foi. Il a apporté en même temps sa conviction—confirmée à chaque instant par les faits—que seule cette collaboration, portée à toutes les manifestations de l'activité et exécutée loyalement, comme les Espagnols l'ont fait depuis le premier jour, saurait conduire le pays à la réalisation accomplie de la mission difficile dont il a assumé au Maroc l'obligation d'honneur. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté croit aveuglément à la sincérité de celui de la République, dont le dernier mémorandum assure les Espagnols de sa *sollicitude fraternelle pour tout ce qui concernerait la sécurité* de leur pays. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté n'a jamais démenti ses sentiments de loyauté et de cordialité envers la nation française et sa vaillante armée qui s'est battue et se bat encore contre les rebelles marocains en collaboration intime avec l'armée espagnole, dont l'effort devient tout de même le plus dur à l'heure actuelle.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a pleine conscience enfin des sacrifices qu'il a le devoir de s'imposer afin de maintenir avec tous les pays les rapports d'amitié que comporte sa politique de conciliation et de paix. Cet ensemble de sentiments et d'idées, ainsi que la politique de conciliation dont il s'est toujours fait un devoir, porte le Gouvernement espagnol à suggérer, une fois encore, des formules qui comporteraient la réduction à des limites vraiment trop minimes des aspirations espagnoles, mais qui seraient quand même viables si la France, toujours généreuse, voulait l'être à l'heure actuelle envers la nation amie et sœur dont l'effort militaire s'est exercé et doit s'exercer encore à côté du sien, dans une des plus grandes entreprises pour la civilisation et le progrès que connait l'histoire de tous les pays.

Animé de cet esprit conciliant, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté réduit maintenant ses aspirations à une seule et unique demande. Il doit pourtant lui attribuer une telle importance et un caractère si fondamental et si indispensable pour la sécurité de la zone espagnole, il la croit si viable, si ajustée au cadre des conventions en vigueur et au statut de 1923, dans son essence, qu'il déclare d'avance qu'il ne s'accommodera de rien qui pourrait la dénaturer, cette dernière demande constituant la limite extrême à laquelle il croit pouvoir arriver sans abandonner totalement les préoccupations et les nécessités qui le poussèrent à la négociation actuelle.

La demande que la délégation espagnole, au nom du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, a l'honneur d'adresser à la délégation française est la suivante :

La police prévue par le statut de 1923 comprendra :

1. *Un corps de gendarmerie indigène*, composé de 500 hommes, susceptible d'être amplifié dans des circonstances exceptionnelles après accord du Comité de Contrôle. Son commandement sera confié à un officier de l'armée espagnole, du grade de commandant ou capitaine, assisté d'officiers et de sous-officiers espagnols et marocains.
2. Une police civile, composée d'agents espagnols et indigènes et dont l'effectif sera analogue à l'actuel. Cette police sera commandée par un commissaire espagnol.
3. La police dont il est question aux deux paragraphes précédents sera placée sous la dépendance directe du Mendoub par l'entremise d'un chef supérieur de police, de nationalité espagnole, responsable envers le Mendoub et le Comité de Contrôle, non pas seulement de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans la zone tangéroise, mais aussi de sa neutralité. Il veillera donc à ce que cette neutralité soit effective et à ce qu'aucune intrigue contre l'ordre établi dans les deux zones de l'Empire ou dans n'importe quel pays étranger ne puisse avoir lieu dans la zone internationale.
4. Dans le cas où les organes en question outrepasseraient leurs attributions, leurs actes seront examinés et jugés par le Comité de Contrôle.

Cette organisation est indispensable. Les Gouvernements français et espagnol, d'accord avec celui de la Grande-Bretagne, prirent la décision en 1925, et plus tard en 1926, de ne pas établir la gendarmerie tant que la zone de Tanger ne serait pas

désarmée. Ce désarmement n'a pas eu lieu. Il ne faut pas oublier, en outre, que la gendarmerie, telle qu'elle a été prévue en 1923, avec un effectif de 250 hommes au maximum et commandée par des Belges, Français, Espagnols et indigènes, serait tout à fait inefficace, autant par son effectif mesquin que par la structure de ses cadres.

La bonne entente nécessaire pour remplir la mission si délicate qui lui est dévolue, que seuls des cadres d'une même nationalité permettraient d'espérer, devient impossible à obtenir lorsqu'il s'agit de cadres de nationalités différentes ; une unité aussi mélangée et aussi réduite ne pourrait pas fonctionner avec des garanties suffisantes quant à l'accomplissement de sa mission et notamment en ce qui concerne l'application de l'article 10 du statut au respect de l'ordre établi dans la zone espagnole.

Toutes les modifications de l'article 10 seraient impuissantes à empêcher des pactes avec les insoumis des tribus limitrophes ; des pactes comme on en a déjà conclus, des pactes dont les officiers espagnols, en minorité, ne pourraient pas éviter les fâcheux effets et qui tendraient à maintenir égoïstement pour Tanger l'amitié des rebelles au prix du sacrifice de l'ordre dans la zone espagnole, alors que la garantie la plus sûre pour la neutralité du territoire tangérois consiste dans l'établissement d'une paix solide dans la zone qui l'entoure.

Quels motifs pourrait-on opposer à l'établissement d'une telle organisation de police, demandée instamment par l'Espagne en substitution de celle qui a été prévue au statut de 1923 ?

Le document présenté par la délégation française en date du 13 juin le fait comprendre ouvertement. D'une part, la crainte que des officiers et des agents appartenant à une même nationalité ne soient pas capables d'affronter impartialement le conflit quotidien des intérêts si complexes qui se débattent à Tanger. D'autre part, la peur d'un contact trop serré avec le Haut-Commissariat de Tétouan. En même temps, l'idée qu'une telle organisation échapperait de droit à l'Administrateur et de fait au Mendoub, qui n'auraient pas à leur disposition l'instrument indispensable à l'accomplissement de leur mission ; l'opinion des colonies étrangères qu'on prétend propices à l'établissement de la gendarmerie prévue par le statut, et d'une façon générale le souci de ne pas ébranler le prestige du statut, invoqué par la délégation française chaque fois qu'elle tâche de justifier ses refus.

Tous ces arguments étant très faibles au fond, le Gouvernement espagnol ne peut pas s'empêcher de voir dans cette faiblesse un signe favorable. Elle prouve que satisfaction peut être donnée par le Gouvernement de la République aux demandes espagnoles, sans un effort considérable de sa part et sans opposition d'aucune Puissance.

L'impartialité et la droiture dont les officiers espagnols ont témoigné pendant de longues années, depuis que le Tabor urbain a été établi, ne sont contestées par personne. Elles sont notoires. Aucune plainte n'a jamais été présentée à propos de leur conduite. Le Tabor urbain, au point de vue de l'organisation comme de la tenue des officiers, a toujours été un modèle. Mais c'est précisément pour prévenir des fautes possibles, sinon probables, dans cet ordre d'idées, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté suggère l'intervention du Comité de Contrôle, sans doute plus qualifié, pour tout ce qui concerne l'application du principe de l'internationalisation, qu'un Administrateur appartenant à n'importe quelle nationalité. L'organisation qu'il a proposée de donner à la police répond justement au souci du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté d'éviter qu'elle dépende d'un Administrateur ou d'une autorité quelconque qui ne soit le Mendoub lui-même, représentant légitime du Sultan. La placer directement sous une autorité relevant d'un seul pays, quel qu'il soit, ne peut en effet que faciliter, comme jusqu'à présent, les agissements provenant de la zone tangéroise dont souffre la zone espagnole et donner lieu à la diffusion des responsabilités entre les divers départements appelés aujourd'hui à intervenir dans des questions qui doivent appartenir à une seule autorité, responsable exclusivement envers le Mendoub et le Comité de Contrôle, seuls représentants du Sultan et des Puissances. Ce serait alors le vrai contrôle international dont le principe constitue l'idée maîtresse des accords de 1923 et aucune organisation n'offrirait par conséquent des garanties d'impartialité plus évidentes et plus solides.

L'esprit du statut de 1923, invoqué si souvent par la délégation française, serait plus à l'abri et plus purifié que jamais, l'organisation demandée par l'Espagne s'appuyant sur les pouvoirs essentiels du régime tangérois : le Sultan et les Puissances. Cette organisation comporterait, d'ailleurs, un plus grand respect des traités que le démembrement territorial proposé par le Gouvernement de la République. Il est à remarquer, en effet, que la cession dont il s'agit entraînerait la complète annulation de l'article 2 du statut et celle des dispositions du traité de 1912 qui établissent d'une façon bien nette les limites de la zone internationale.

En ce qui a trait à l'opinion des colonies étrangères, soi-disant favorables à l'établissement de la gendarmerie, une fois les affirmations qui s'y rapportent privées de leur caractère factice et intéressé, on arrive à la conclusion que c'est seulement l'efficacité de la méthode qui préoccupe les colonies en question. On ne peut pas nier, par contre, l'existence d'une tendance d'après laquelle, et sous le couvert d'une internationalisation illusoire, la situation déjà privilégiée, quoique légale, au sein de l'Administration tangéroise d'une seule Puissance—du fait de son rôle auprès du Sultan—irait jusqu'à absorber toutes les juridictions sans admettre d'autres influences, même les plus justifiées et les plus légitimes, au point de rendre impossible le remède aux dangers que le Gouvernement espagnol a signalés à Tanger et au point de rendre également impossible non seulement la solution de la question de la police, mais aussi celle de toutes les questions se rattachant à la zone internationale.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, se basant sur les raisons déjà exposées et qu'il serait inutile de répéter, se verrait donc dans l'impossibilité d'accepter la cession territoriale d'une partie de la zone tangéroise, même dans le cas où les conditions onéreuses dont il a été question viendraient à être complètement enlevées.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté espère, d'autre part, que, d'après ce qui a été convenu dans les lettres du 7 février 1924 annexées à la Convention de Paris de 1923, la commission chargée d'examiner la question concernant le placement sous la souveraineté espagnole des sources alimentant les places de Ceuta et de Melilla, ainsi que les chemins qui y mènent, sera convoquée aussitôt que possible.

En échange de toutes ces concessions, le Gouvernement espagnol se montrerait propice à la cession totale de la confédération des Beni-Zéroual, ainsi qu'à quelque autre cession territoriale, du côté sud de la zone espagnole, qui pourrait être considérée comme une rectification de frontière et que la délégation espagnole se ferait un devoir d'examiner aussitôt.

La délégation espagnole n'aurait pas d'inconvénient à accepter également en échange des concessions susvisées l'octroi réciproque de la faculté de poursuite dans le territoire de Rio de Oro. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne voit pourtant pas la possibilité d'accorder la même faculté en ce qui concerne le territoire d'Ifni placé sous la souveraineté espagnole et qu'il se propose d'occuper dans un bref délai.

Il n'y aurait pas d'inconvénient, enfin, de la part du Gouvernement espagnol, à accepter les mesures, cependant complémentaires dans son esprit, que le Gouvernement français a proposées en vue de modifier l'article 10 du statut et du Code pénal. L'expulsion, pour un délai de dix ans, pourrait pourtant être prolongée dans les cas où le Tribunal mixte viendrait à vérifier que le coupable, pendant la période de durée de son exil, persistait à conspirer ou à participer à des intrigues contraires à l'ordre et à la paix.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne croit pas indispensable d'insister une fois encore sur l'expression de ses sentiments d'amitié vis-à-vis de la nation française. La lourde tâche dont aucun des deux pays ne pourrait s'acquitter au Maroc sans une collaboration loyale et réciproque, constitue, à elle seule, un lien puissant qui doit suffire à consolider leur amitié chaque jour davantage.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté croit donner aujourd'hui une preuve évidente de ses sentiments de cordialité en ayant l'honneur de proposer, par le présent document, une solution simple, ajustée au cadre des traités et favorable à tous les intérêts en présence. Si le Gouvernement de la République, comme il est à espérer, voulait apporter à son examen l'esprit de désintéressement dont le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a fait preuve, la solution dont il s'agit comportera celle des présentes négociations et entraînera, sans aucun doute, l'adhésion au statut de toutes les Puissances, sans réserves ni difficultés.

Il serait regrettable que les revendications espagnoles, si raisonnables et modestes, fussent, encore une fois, et contre tout ce qu'il y a lieu d'espérer, dédaignées par le Gouvernement de la République, d'autant plus qu'un semblable refus viendrait très possiblement compliquer et entraver à tous les points de vue et d'une façon sérieuse et innécessaire la solution intégrale d'un problème aussi essentiel que celui de la totale pacification et de la plus grande prospérité du Maroc.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté se plaît, au contraire, à espérer que celui de la République française voudra bien donner une preuve réelle de son amicale disposition et du prix qu'il attache sans doute à l'amitié espagnole si sincère et cordiale. Le document présent, lui-même, peut fournir au Gouvernement de la République les arguments suffisants pour porter à son opinion publique la conviction des avantages positifs que les solutions proposées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté comporteraient pour les intérêts français, étroitement liés à cet idéal des deux pays qui n'est autre que

l'établissement d'une paix solide, capable de permettre la libre action des deux Gouvernements dans leurs protectorats respectifs.

Dans le cas où les propositions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté viendraient à être acceptées, il s'ensuivrait certainement un accroissement du prestige espagnol, dans Tanger et sa zone. Mais cette évolution serait plutôt pour la France une occasion de joie sincère qu'un motif de préoccupation ou de chagrin. Les aspirations françaises ne peuvent viser, en effet, qu'à rendre aisé l'établissement de la paix, grâce à laquelle l'action de protectorat des deux pays, instrument d'une paix conjointe et totale, deviendrait facile et possible. Si d'autres sentiments, d'autres passions, des rivalités ou des jalousies venaient à inspirer les organes chargés d'assurer la liaison entre les deux pays, les intérêts des deux nations ne seraient pas bien servis. Les intérêts supérieurs de l'humanité et de la civilisation non plus.

En ce qui la concerne, l'Espagne n'a pas d'autre désir que celui de partager aussi bien les joies et les espoirs que les soucis et les difficultés de la nation amie et associée. Elle est sûre de trouver la plus complète réciprocité à cet égard. Il n'y aurait rien à espérer, en effet, d'une politique de collaboration appliquée sans sincérité, ni loyauté ; d'une politique de collaboration qui ne mériterait pas ce titre et qui ne répondrait pas au noble espoir des deux nations. D'ailleurs, des pactes conclus avec des dissimulations et des arrière-pensées ne seraient pas dignes des deux Gouvernements, ni de leurs sentiments d'amitié réciproque.

Paris, le 2 juillet 1927.

[**W 6403/11/28**] No. 13.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (*Paris*).

(No. 1865.)

My Lord Marquess, *Foreign Office, July 8*, 1927.

I ASKED the French Ambassador to call to-day in order to speak to him about the deadlock in the Franco-Spanish conversations on Tangier. I reminded him that when I met M. Briand at Geneva he had expressed himself despondently as to the prospects of success, and had asked me to say a word at Madrid to impress the Spanish Government with my interest in the matter. This I had done, but yesterday the Spanish Ambassador had come to inform me that the proposals which M. Briand had then foreshadowed were quite unacceptable to the Spanish Government, who had now reduced their demands to the single point of the control of the gendarmerie and police, that this was their absolute minimum, and that unless this were conceded they must withdraw from the conversations and take whatever measures the failure of the conference might necessitate.

I told M. de Fleuriau that I had replied to the Spanish Ambassador that it was not easy to see what I could do to prevent this misfortune. I had enquired of him, however, whether it would be acceptable to his Government if I were to propose that the conversations *à deux* should now be exchanged for conversations *à quatre*.

The Spanish Ambassador was unable to answer my question without further reference to his Government, which I had asked him to make. I would now request M. de Fleuriau to sound the French Government quite unofficially as to whether such an invitation would be agreeable to them, and I would earnestly beg that no answer likely to put an end to the conversations should be given to the Spanish note until at least this suggestion had been considered.

M. de Fleuriau replied that he was already in a position to say that his Government would accept. He would interpret my proposal as being a suggestion that the results of the Franco-Spanish negotiations should now be reported to the other two Powers as originally arranged, although these results were purely negative and not, as had been hoped, a solution upon which France and Spain had reached agreement. Speaking personally, M. de Fleuriau thought there would be an advantage in the presence of the representatives of Great Britain and Italy. He had never been very sanguine of a successful result of the Franco-Spanish conversations. He added that it was impossible for France to agree to the Spanish demand and that the Spanish method of negotiating and the tone of their last reply had made a very disagreeable impression on M. Briand.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 7240/11/28] No. 14.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Agar-Robartes (Madrid).

(No. 365.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 29, 1927.

THE Spanish Ambassador enquired to-day whether I had yet received any reply from the French Government to the enquiry which I made of M. de Fleuriau as to how they would view a suggestion by me that Spain and France should now report the negative results of the *conversations à deux* to a *conférence à quatre*.

I told his Excellency that I had not yet received any reply and I had refrained from pressing for one. I suspected that the French Government thought there was some advantage in gaining time and thus allowing the rather heated feelings which had been aroused on each side to cool. It was possible also that they were awaiting the return to Paris of M. Briand, who, I understood, was now spending nearly all of his time at Cocherel. I had, of course, pressed urgently upon the French Government that they should not send any reply to the latest Spanish communication until they had at least given serious consideration to my suggestion for a meeting of the four Powers. I could not believe that there was any possibility that such a reply would be sent to Spain before an answer had been returned to me and I had been given the opportunity to make my observations upon it. I myself was inclined to think that there was advantage in the delay. We could not in any case convoke the conference of the four Powers during the month of August; at the beginning of September we should have to be in Geneva, and October was probably the earliest date at which we could in any case have met.

The Ambassador appeared entirely satisfied with this programme, always on the understanding that in the meantime the French would not return a refusal to the last Spanish demand. If that were to happen, Spain would have exhausted her powers of conciliation, and the consequences which he had already mentioned would inevitably follow.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[W 9631/9561/41] No. 15.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir H. Rumbold (Madrid).

(No. 466.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 10, 1927.

AS you are aware, General Primo de Rivera had sent to me whilst I was at Geneva a message through the Spanish Ambassador in Paris and Lord Crewe, expressing the hope that, if I was in Spanish waters, a meeting might be arranged between us. As my plans were dependent upon the wishes of my host and on the weather, I could at the moment only express the pleasure which such a meeting would give me and promise that, if I found I was likely to be at a suitable Spanish port, I would communicate with the general through your Excellency. As it turned out, we found ourselves rather unexpectedly at Barcelona but only for twelve hours, and I accordingly begged the prefect to explain to General Primo that I hoped to visit Barcelona again on my return journey and that, as soon as I was able to indicate a date, I would telegraph to him from Majorca. I was, of course, unaware of the fact that the King and Queen were proceeding almost immediately to Morocco and that General Primo would be leaving with them. In these circumstances the general was good enough to propose to meet me at Palma, to which place I at once proceeded from Alendia where we had passed a day. We reached Palma in the afternoon and the general himself arrived at 8 o'clock in the evening and accepted my invitation to dine with us on the yacht. In the course of dinner he appeared thoroughly pleased to have the opportunity of meeting me and was extremely courteous and amiable.

The course of conversation enabled me during dinner to raise the question of Spain's relations with the League of Nations and to say to him personally what I had already said to King Alfonso and to the Spanish Ambassadors both here and in Paris of the great position which Spain had acquired in the Council of the League, of the great services which it was possible for her to render to the League, and of my profound regret that, for the time being, she had withdrawn from active

co-operation. I repeated the expression of my hope that an occasion would presently be found for her to resume her former position and intimate co-operation.

The general did not commit himself in reply. He showed that he had been fully informed of my conversations both with King Alfonso and Señor Quiñones de León. I gathered the impression that he felt that he had made a mistake, but that he did not know exactly how to recover his position. He dwelt with emphasis on Spain's continued co-operation with the League in various Commissions and he let drop a phrase about the need of Spain and of the present Spanish régime for prestige, which is, I suppose, the true explanation of his unfortunate action and he suggested that the refusal of re-eligibility to Belgium made it less likely that Spain would receive that special acknowledgment of her position. I combated this idea, which I think is unfounded, and I am inclined to believe that, if the Tangier question can be settled, it will not be long before he finds means to re-enter the League.

After dinner I arranged a private conversation between the general and myself in order to give him the opportunity which I knew he must desire to speak to me confidentially about Tangier. He gave me a long account of the history and present position of the question from the Spanish point of view. He knew that I considered he had made a mistake in opening his mouth so wide at the beginning, and he even admitted that perhaps that might be so, but now, he said, Spain had reduced her claims to an absolute minimum—such a control of the police as would guarantee her against the rearmament of the Riff tribes by a contraband trade carried on through Tangier and against the use of Tangier as a centre of anti-Spanish intrigue and conspiracy.

I told him that I had spoken of the negotiations to M. Briand whilst at Geneva. I had found M. Briand really anxious to arrive at a solution which would give Spain just that security which she needed. I did not think that M. Briand had any precise plans at the moment, but I had begged him to take the question into his own hands and to give his personal attention to it, and he had assured me that he was already having it studied from this point of view. In my opinion it was unlikely that success would be obtained by a renewed meeting of the Franco-Spanish Commission, though it might meet to register or complete an agreement which had already been secured in a more personal negotiation. I would, therefore, venture to urge upon General Primo that he should instruct Señor Quiñones de León to take up the question personally with M. Briand. I did not think it probable that M. Briand could accept the latest Spanish proposals in the form in which they were made. I therefore begged the general to allow a certain elasticity in his policy and, provided the security which was his object were obtained, not to insist upon his own particular plan for obtaining it. I further permitted myself to repeat to General Primo what I had already said to Señor Quiñones when passing through Paris and which I knew Señor Quiñones would have reported to him, namely, that Spain in her colonial history had suffered much through allowing herself to be ill-represented in her colonies. General Primo had, I recognised, worked a remarkable change in this respect in Morocco, but I urged that the least mistake or peccadillo committed in that country almost necessarily assumed an exaggerated importance, and I begged him to continue to watch affairs with the closest personal attention and in particular to select a *personnel d'élite*, both military and civil, for the Spanish service in Morocco.

The general received all this in a most amiable spirit. He thanked me for my very friendly attitude and advice and assured me that, on his return to Madrid, he would instruct Señor Quiñones to enter into direct pourparlers with M. Briand.

The general spent in all some two and a half or three hours on board the yacht, but in the above account I have given you everything of substance which passed between us. You will judge, therefore, the surprise with which, on opening the French papers yesterday morning in Paris, I saw an account of the interview which General Primo de Rivera was alleged to have given to a correspondent of the "Sunday Times." From this interview it would appear that our meeting had been carefully prearranged, and my holiday cruise might almost have been designed for the express purpose of securing it; that I had professed myself confident that I had a solution of the difficulties which had arisen between the French and Spanish and had offered myself as mediator; that it had been arranged that General Primo should visit London and that there was in contemplation some kind of treaty between the two countries, the purpose of which is very obscurely intimated. I had dined with Señor Quiñones the night before, when I had told him exactly what had passed between General Primo de Rivera and myself. As our meeting had given rise to

some foolish and ignorant comment in a section of the French press, I had thought it well to receive the representatives of the press in the afternoon and with careful discretion I intimated to them the character and scope of our conversation. The interview attributed to General Primo gave an entirely different account of our meeting and was indeed in flat contradiction with what I had said. I felt, therefore, that it was a fortunate circumstance that I had accepted an invitation to lunch with M. Guani on Sunday and that Señor Quiñones was to be one of the guests. I took the Spanish Ambassador aside after luncheon and said that I had been not a little surprised when I opened my papers that morning to read the observations which General Primo was reported to have made. I pointed out their inaccuracy and their inconvenience, and I told Señor Quiñones that I was certain that the reporter must have misunderstood General Primo, and that I hoped that he would issue a rectification. Señor Quiñones informed me that he had been as much surprised and troubled as I was, that he had already been in direct personal communication by telephone with the general, and that he would communicate again in the course of the day. He was quite certain that there must have been a misunderstanding. He enquired in particular as to whether the general had said anything about the abandonment of the Spanish sphere, and I replied that he had not, and the Ambassador said that it was incredible that he should have given utterance to the sentiments attributed to him in regard to this matter at such a moment. I told Señor Quiñones that I should make no further communication to the press in Paris and would if possible avoid any communication to the press on my return to London. If forced to say anything I should say that I was certain that there had been a misunderstanding with which the general himself would no doubt deal as he thought necessary.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

October 11.—I have this morning received from Señor Quiñones, through our Embassy in Paris, the following message, which will doubtless be confirmed to me by the Marquis Merry del Val in the course of to-day:—

A. C.

"Je désirais vous voir pour vous prier de dire à Sir Austen Chamberlain que j'avais télégraphié hier à mon Président du Conseil dans le sens qu'il m'avait demandé et que je pensais avoir une réponse dans la journée. Effectivement, elle vient de m'arriver.

"Le Général Primo de Rivera me télégraphie qu'il charge Merry del Val de faire savoir à Sir Austen qu'après sa note à la presse de Palma de Mallorca il n'en a donné aucune autre ni verbalement ni par écrit et qu'il n'a parlé de son entrevue, si agréable, qu'avec Sa Majesté et le Gouvernement. Il va donner une nouvelle note à la presse dans ce sens, en ajoutant que ni lui ni son secrétariat n'ont donné l'interview à laquelle fait référence le 'Sunday Times.' Il ajoute, à Merry del Val, qu'il est pleinement d'accord avec les déclarations faites par Sir Austen.

"Je me fais un plaisir de vous communiquer cette réponse, en vous priant, si vous n'y voyez pas d'inconvénient, de la faire parvenir au plus tôt à Sir Austen, qui, je crois, l'attendait, pour faire, de son côté, une communication à la presse de Londres."

[**W 9638/9561/41**] No. 16.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir H. Rumbold (*Madrid*).

(No. 467.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 11, 1927.

THE Spanish Ambassador called upon me this afternoon to inform me, in accordance with instructions twice repeated by General Primo de Rivera—at first, doubtless, in consequence of my conversation with Señor Quiñones de León in Paris, and secondly in consequence of the Marquis Merry del Val's own telegrams—that neither the general himself nor any of his secretaries at Madrid or in Malaga had given any interview to a correspondent of the "Sunday Times." The general had made no statement to the press on the subject of our interview at Palma except the communique which he had issued immediately on his return to Barcelona, and the

only people to whom he had reported upon our conversation were the King and the Cabinet.

I thanked the Ambassador for the communication which I told him was entirely satisfactory. I had been quite certain that there had at least been a great misunderstanding, but I was glad to know that in fact the interview had never taken place. I told his Excellency that I had already written a personal note to General Primo de Rivera to thank him for the kindness shown me by all the Spanish authorities and to express my great appreciation of his courtesy in coming to Majorca to see me, but I would beg the Ambassador to repeat my thanks and to say how much pleasure it had given me to make the general's acquaintance.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[**W 10577/199/41**] No. 17.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir H. Rumbold (*Madrid*).

(No. 515.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 12, 1927.

THE Spanish Ambassador sent me word that he had a communication to make to me which he thought would give me great pleasure. I accordingly invited him to call yesterday afternoon, and, with the same preliminary observation, he informed me that he had received a letter from the Spanish Prime Minister a part of which he would read to me. He explained that General Primo de Rivera had never expressed himself so explicitly before to the Ambassador, nor given him so clear an exposition of the reasons for his policy. After this rather formidable prelude he went on to say that in this letter the Prime Minister described certain difficulties which he had had with Signor Mussolini, who had twice recently complained of some statement in a Spanish newspaper which had escaped the censorship. The Ambassador was neither very explicit nor very lucid at this point of the conversation, but I gathered that the object of the earlier part of the letter must have been to explain the slightly uneasy character of Spain's relations with Italy and the impossibility of basing Spanish policy upon an accord or alliance with Italy. Be this as it may, the Ambassador then read me a passage in which, in the most explicit and cordial terms, the Prime Minister declared the necessity for Spain of a close friendship with Great Britain, to whose general policy Spain desired to conform. General Primo de Rivera had wished this statement to be communicated to me, and he had wished me at the same time to be told that he recognised the need for very friendly relations between Spain and France and that he was particularly pleased with M. Briand's attitude. The Spanish Government had sometimes had cause in the past to complain of the laxity of French Governments in dealing with Spanish conspiracies hatched on French soil, but in the case of the recent conspiracy the attitude of the French Government directed by M. Briand had been everything that the Spanish Government could wish.

I replied that I had received the communication which General Primo de Rivera had entrusted to the Ambassador with the greatest pleasure. His Excellency knew that I was animated by equally friendly feelings towards his country and that nothing would be lacking on my part to confirm our excellent relations. The statement which he had made in regard to Spain's relations with France gave me almost equal pleasure. I regarded the friendship of France and England as the necessary basis for European peace and the only foundation on which we could build the reconciliation of France and Germany. That the friendly feelings which the Prime Minister of Spain entertained to this country should extend to France gave me, therefore, the greatest satisfaction.

General Primo de Rivera having at the close of his letter re-stated the position of Spain in regard to Tangier and expressed regret that France had not yet given her any satisfaction in that sphere, I once again said that M. Briand, in conversation with me, had recognised that Spain had a right to be secured against the use of Tangier either for a trade in contraband with the Riff or as a base of conspiracy against Spanish authority in the Spanish zone, and that he had told me that he was seeking in what form that security could be given. This was, as I understood, the purpose of whatever demands Spain had at any time made, and, provided that that purpose was attained, I repeated my hope that the Prime Minister would be content

to secure it in the form in which it could be offered without insisting that it must be given in the particular way which he had last proposed.

The flourish of trumpets with which the Ambassador introduced this conversation and his twice repeated assurance that what he had to say would be particularly pleasing to me naturally set me reflecting upon the exact meaning which I should attach to his communication. After careful consideration I think that I am justified in inferring that General Primo de Rivera, irritated by the licence accorded in France to Spanish refugees and conspirators and by the attitude of the French Government in the Tangier question, had at one time seriously contemplated the formation of an Italian-Spanish-Portuguese *bloc* for which he hoped to enlist British support, but that he had now definitely abandoned that idea partly because he feared the Italians *et dona ferentes* and partly because he perceived that we were positively opposed to any such project, and that he had, therefore, now decided to cultivate good relations with France as a necessity of the sympathy and help which he hoped to secure from us.

I shall be glad to receive your comments on the Ambassador's communication and on the inference which I have drawn from it. If my account of what he said seems rather obscure I must plead that the Ambassador's language was not less so.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

(b.) Miscellaneous.

[**W 7769/7769/28**] No. 18.

Acting Consul-General Bond to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received August* 16.)

(No. 166.)

Sir, *Tangier, August* 4, 1927.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Tangier–Fez Railway is now open to passenger and goods traffic. The first train was run from Meknes to Tangier on the 24th ultimo, carrying the chief officials of the French zone section, and picking up at Alcazar and Arzeila respectively the officials of the Spanish and Tangier sections. Although frequent halts were made for speeches and champagne, it is understood that the opening ceremony was only semi-official in character, and that an appropriate official function will be staged at a later date when certain indispensable personages have returned from their summer holidays in Europe. Nevertheless, this first train was greeted by such enthusiasm as made its safe berthing at Tangier platform a difficult feat. The coaches are adequate, and will later be improved by additions from the Compagnie internationale des Wagons-Lits.

2. Since the 25th ultimo, a service of one train a day each way has been maintained. The south-bound train is scheduled to leave Tangier at 7·40 A.M., to arrive at Petitjean at 2·55 P.M., that is in time to catch the 3·25 P.M. connection for Rabat and Casablanca (arrive 8·10 P.M.), and to reach Fez at 8 P.M. The north-bound train is timed to leave Fez at 7 A.M., picking up at Petitjean the connection which leaves Casablanca at 7 A.M. also, and to arrive at Tangier at 7·20 P.M. The distance by rail between Tangier and Fez is a little less than 200 miles, and Tangier is now the rail-head of a working normal-gauge system of some 400 miles in length.

3. The time table, of which I will forward copies as soon as available, is as yet only approximate as a guide, but it will be considerably improved when the 15 kilom. of ballast still lacking in the Spanish zone have been laid, and the facing and revetting of most of the cuttings and embankments completed. This will take until the end of the year. Until then trains have to move warily past the working parties.

4. The new service is being well patronised, especially in the international and Spanish sections. Total receipts from passenger and goods traffic during the first week's working have amounted to some 50,000 fr. The service has been utilised since its inception by the military authorities of the neighbouring zone, which augurs well for its appreciation and support by the Spanish authorities, and I am assured by the French chief engineer of the international section that they are most unlikely to obstruct its working in any way. Nevertheless, I foresee an increasing diminution of trade through the port of Laraiche, and this may cause repercussions when the novelty of playing at trains has worn off.

5. It is noteworthy in this connection that, whereas the Spanish elements of Tangier have been more devoted than any other in acclaiming the arrival of the train every evening, the French press has given considerably greater prominence than the Spanish to the opening of the line. The "Porvenir's" only article on the subject, indeed, closed with a pessimistic commentary on Tangier's "isolation."

6. Of the four stations planned, the Tangier Sharf station is at present the only one in use. It lies nearly 2 miles to the east of the town. This disadvantage is being outweighed by the simultaneous appearance on Tangier streets of the first units of a fleet of neat white Citroën taxicabs, which is of itself a material sign of confidence in the future; the Moghogha station, 2 miles south-east of the town, will be devoted to rolling-stock sidings and machine and repair sheds; it is not yet in operation. Two stations remain to be laid out and built: the town station, on the sand dunes, half a mile to the east of the present town, and the port station. The completion of the latter may be envisaged first, probably for the end of next year, by which time the port should be well advanced.

7. I propose to deal with freight rates and their relative incidence in the three zones in a later despatch.

8. I have the honour to enclose copy of some notes made by His Majesty's vice-consul at Fez, who travelled by train to Tangier on the third day of its running.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's consul-general at Rabat, His Majesty's consul at Tetuan, and his Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Notes on a Journey from Fez to Tangier on the newly-opened Tangier–Fez Railway, July 28, 1927.

LUGGAGE registered through from Fez to places outside the French zone must be accompanied by a customs declaration filled up in triplicate. This formality makes it necessary to be at the station about half an hour before the train is due to start.

The train on which I travelled left Fez to time, at 7 A.M., and was composed of one Pullman-type coach for first and second class passengers, two third class and three fourth class carriages, and about a dozen goods vans and trucks. Petitjean was reached at 11·15 A.M., and there connection was made with the Casablanca and Rabat train. At Souk-el-Arba the French customs and police boarded the train for the examination of luggage and passports. Here the French collect the export duty on goods of Moorish origin leaving the French zone. A customs official told me that they had orders to collect this duty on all goods, even on those destined to be exported from ports in the Spanish or Tangier zones. The object of this practice being to ensure the French zone receiving the export duty on goods coming from and made in that zone. It therefore seems likely that persons from the French zone leaving Morocco from a port in the Spanish or Tangier zones will be called upon to pay export duty twice until some arrangement is made for the issue of passavants. There was no examination of luggage in the Spanish zone. This was due, I was told, to the fact that the Spanish Administration has not yet organised the customs service on the railway. I understand that the Spaniards will collect the full import duty on all goods of foreign origin entering the Spanish zone from either the French or Tangier zones, although I had the impression that an understanding in this matter existed between the zone of Tangier and the Spanish zone. We reached Alcazar at 3·58 P.M., and left at 4·43 P.M. The excessive delay here was due to the engine having to go off to the Loukkos River to fill up with water; the water supply at the station of Alcazar being not yet established. Connection is made here with the train for Laraiche. Progress between Alcazar and Arzeila was hindered on several occasions by flocks of cattle and sheep grazing on the line. Twice the engine-driver was unable to pull up in time and a cow and a pony were killed. The train arrived in Tangier at 7·55 P.M., only thirty-five minutes late. Here the Tangier customs were passed and passports examined.

The permanent-way, considering its newness, was in very good condition. The stations in the French zone, where this section of the line has been in operation for three and a half years up to Petitjean, were all finished and manned. In the Spanish

zone none were so far advanced. The quality of the constructions in course of erection in the Spanish zone was considerably higher than of similar works in the French zone. Alcazar is already quite an imposing station and much finer than that of Fez or of Meknes.

Although the train took thirteen hours to do 310 kilom., this does not seem excessive in view of the fact that the track has still to settle down; the train, too, was a mixed one for goods and passengers, in consequence much time was lost in shunting at various stations.

One half of the Pullman coach was set aside for first-class passengers, and the other half for the second-class. Meals, well cooked, were served as required, and the seating accommodation was good.

The fares from Fez to Tangier are as follows:—

	Frs.	cts.
First class	142	40
Second class	109	87
Third class	75	25
Fourth class	54	16

These charges are liable to fluctuate with the movements of the franc-peseta exchange.

Tangier, July 30, 1927.

[**W 10460/11/28**] No. 19.

Mr. Gurney to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 214.)

Sir, *Tangier, November* 1, 1927.

I HAD the honour to report to you in my telegram No. 25 yesterday the conclusion of the visit to Tangier of three Italian vessels under the command of His Royal Highness the Prince of Udine.

2. It would appear that, in planning the visit, the Italians themselves had little idea of making more than an "acte de présence" on the suitable occasion of the anniversary of the Fascist march on Rome, and the considerable attention which has been paid to it by the European press would seem to be largely the result of the journalistic efforts of Mr. Harris, the "Times" correspondent in Morocco.

3. The 28th October, the anniversary of the march on Rome, had been chosen some time ago by M. Bastianini, the recently appointed Italian diplomatic agent and consul-general, who is an ardent Fascist, as a timely occasion for the reopening of the newly acquired palace of the ex-Sultan Mulai Hafid as an Italian school and dispensary, as also for the inauguration of an Italian club and the display of two Fascist films, and it was, I fancy, somewhat as an afterthought that it was arranged that Prince Udine should attend the ceremonies on his way back from Lisbon with his squadron.

4. The light cruiser "Bari" (late of the German navy) and the destroyers "Sauro" and "Manin" dropped anchor here on the morning of the 27th. My Italian colleague visited His Royal Highness on board the "Bari" at 9·30 and returned at 10. The Prince came ashore at 10·30, was received by M. Bastianini and the Italian colony at the pier, and drove at once to the Mendoubia, where he called upon Si Mohammed bou Ashreen in his capacity as Sultan's representative. At 11, His Royal Highness received the visits of the foreign representatives at the Italian agency, which, by the way, he did not return. The Mendoub returned the Prince's visit at noon on board the "Bari." He was received with a guard of honour, and a salute of seventeen guns was fired on his departure.

5. An official dinner was given that evening at the Italian agency, the Mendoub, the foreign representatives and their wives, Si Mehdi-el-Menebhi and Mr. Harris being present. Naturally enough, M. Bastianini had not invited any members of the International Administration which Italy has not recognised. The presence of Mr. Harris was no doubt due to the courteous offer of his services which he had previously conveyed to His Royal Highness, whilst Menebhi was included as a picturesque figure and a prospective host.

6. On the following day, the anniversary of the march on Rome, the Prince spent a busy morning presiding at the inauguration of the various institutions above mentioned. He made no speeches, but he permitted Mr. Harris to express to his newspaper, in language which, as he afterwards stated "could not have been bettered in Rome itself," the views on Italy's aspirations in regard to Tangier which Mr. Harris had derived from conversations

with the Prince and M. Bastianini. Mr. Harris's telegram was printed in the "Times" of the 29th ultimo.

7. Luncheon followed at Menebhi's. It was attended by the Prince and his suite as well as the French and Spanish consuls-general, my wife and myself and my staff, and the Marquis and Marchioness of Bute, who were staying with us.

8. Two interesting but unduly long films depicting the march on Rome and the activities of Signor Mussolini and the Fascist militia were given in the afternoon at the Kursaal in the presence of the foreign representatives and a large and enthusiastic gathering of the Italian colony.

9. In the evening, M. and Mme. Bastianini gave a reception and ball which was attended, amongst others, by most of the more prominent members of the Administration "in their private capacities," with the exception of M. Alberge.

10. On Saturday, the Prince and some of my colleagues were my guests at a picnic luncheon, on the occasion of a hunt specially arranged by the Tangier Tent Club. On Sunday afternoon a choppy sea prevented us from having the pleasure of attending a *thé dansant* which was to have taken place on board the "Bari." Instead, His Royal Highness visited the mountainous outskirts of the Spanish zone. In the evening, the American diplomatic agent gave a small dinner in his honour, which my wife and I attended with my Italian and Spanish colleagues. The squadron sailed yesterday morning for Gibraltar.

11. The behaviour of the Italian sailors was unexceptionable and the visit left an agreeable local impression, but though the Spanish press published most sympathetic articles, the French newspaper refrained from any allusion to the visit, an exhibition of childish ill-humour which the editor has sought to explain by the non-receipt of any invitation to attend the various functions.

12. M. Bastianini, who is to be congratulated on the excellence of his arrangements, tells me that the Prince so much enjoyed his visit to Tangier that he stopped a day longer than was intended and will, in consequence, reach Italy too late to be present at the marriage of his cousin, the Duc de Apulia, which is to take place at Naples this week.

13. In confirming to me the statement published by Mr. Harris, M. Bastianini made it clear that the visit was not meant to be more than an "acte de présence" and an indication that Italy did not intend to allow herself to be overlooked in any settlement which might be arrived at on the Tangier question. He said that neither he nor the Prince had any authority to publish a manifesto, whilst I gather that the Italian Government have no intention of forcing the hand of the French in any way and are content to await developments, at any rate, for the present.

I have, &c.
HUGH GURNEY.

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